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This thesis attempts to determine whether the apparent
shift in Soviet "local war" doctrine, reflecting an increased
willingness to involve Soviet military force in Third World
crises, provided an important rationale for the construction
of the first legitimate attack aircraft carrier. Following
a historical chronology of Soviet perceptions about aircraft
carriers, this study details Soviet thought on aircraft
carriers in general and their utility in particular, during
the period 1969-1977; the juncture wherein the apparent shift
in their doctrine and the formal decision to build the carrier
occurred. It is the contention of this writer that the nearly
simultaneous occurrence of these events was more than mere
coincidence. Moscow has long understood the utility of navies
as a political and military tool in Third World crises and
may have decided to provide this branch of their armed forces
with increased capabilities to intervene more decisively and
to effect terms favorable to Soviet foreign policy objectives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although Soviet naval leaders have long recognized the
capabilities of aircraft carriers, many Western naval analysts,
including Norman Polmar, Michael MccGwire, Charles Peterson,
and Dov Zakheim, believe that the formal decision to build a
class of such ships did not occur until the mid-1970s. Hence,
it appears plausible that the rationale for this decision can
be discerned by analyzing Soviet military writings of the
period prior to the decision and by studying the political
and military context wherein this decision was made. Events
occurring at the time influenced Soviet doctrine and reflected
a reappraisal of the role of aircraft carriers in the Soviet
navy.
This paper examines the period of the late 1960s to the
mid 1970s in Soviet history in an attempt to discern some of
the rationale for the construction of the Soviet attack CTOL
aircraft carrier and to identify possible missions for the
ship. Chapter II examines the history of Soviet thought
towards aircraft carriers.
Many factors played a part in the Soviet decision not to
build a true strike aircraft carrier. An examination of
secondary sources concerning Soviet thought on naval doctrine
from 1917 through 1970 reveals that among these problems were
economic constraints and technological deficiencies. At times
(especially postwar periods) these played a role, but overall
the main reason was carrier construction simply did not fit
into their doctrine- -one of defense. Substantial Soviet
economic growth in the 1930s and again in the 1950s was not
accompanied by any formal Kremlin decision to build aircraft
carriers. Therefore it seems plausible that although capa-
bilities to build were there, the main reason for Soviet
hesitation was doctrinal. However, as articulated by the
Soviets, doctrine is not static, but dynamic. This is
especially evident in Soviet writings on local war. Chapter
III traces the evolution of Soviet local war doctrine.
Before the 1970s there was very little direct Soviet
involvement in Third World conflicts. A factor inhibiting
a more aggressive role for Soviet military forces in Third
World crises was the Politburo's fear that local war would
necessarily escalate to world war. These perceptions changed
when the Soviets achieved an ambiguous strategic nuclear
parity with the U.S. in the early 1970s, which they thought
would act as a deterrent to U.S. escalation of these local
wars. Therefore, local wars could be managed and contained.
Furthermore, as years passed, the Politburo evidently con-
cluded that in order to protect fledgling socialist gains
they would have to do more militarily. These two factors
provided the motivation for greater Soviet military
involvement in defense of their state interests. An
examination of Soviet thought on local wars reveals that a
shift reflecting the need for a greater military role in such
conflicts occurred in the early 1970s. Consistent with this
enhanced military role, the Soviets sought to give their navy
greater capabilities with which to achieve its seemingly more
ambitious political and military objectives.
These greater capabilities were to be satisfied by
providing the Soviet navy with aircraft carriers. The
carrier construction sequence in the Soviet Union is discussed
in Chapter IV. Though the first two attempts to deploy air
capable ships were designed primarily to counter Western
submarines, they found these platforms ill-suited for the
power projection role required in distant conflicts. This
became evident during Soviet involvement in local wars when
Soviet ships were incapable of decisively affecting the
tactical situation on shore.
An examination of Soviet naval involvement in Third World
crises follows in Chapter V. The Soviet decision to build
aircraft carriers in the early 1970s reflected, in part, a
shift in Soviet military doctrine pertaining to Third World
crises. Historically, their naval doctrine was strictly
defensive allowing no position for extremely expensive air-
craft carriers. The object was to defend the water boundaries
of the homeland. In the 1960s, the Soviets practiced a
forward strategy essentially projecting their naval forces
to operating areas distant from the Soviet Union. Originally
implemented to counter American strategic nuclear strike
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systems based at sea, they found naval forces effective in
pursuing their foreign policy goals in the developing world.
The Soviets saw a need to develop power projection capabilities
and, after observing U.S. aircraft carriers in local wars,
came to the conclusion that this would be an effective weapon.
Chapter VI examines original source information on Soviet
thought about the use of aircraft carriers in local war.
Many Soviet analysts argue: (1) that aircraft carriers are
the only viable means of providing air support for distant
naval operations; (2) that aircraft carriers are the only
means of providing forward bases for Soviet aircraft when
foreign bases cannot be guaranteed; and (3) that by making
it possible to bring Soviet airpower to bear on distant shores,
modern attack aircraft carriers are considered crucial in
determining the favorable outcome of local conflicts.
Thus, it appears that the Soviet decision to construct
their first attack aircraft carrier followed a shift in Soviet
ideas on local war and greater military involvement in such
wars. This writer contends that the apparent simultaneous
shift in Soviet ideas on local war and the formal decision to
construct the carrier were more than mere coincidence. A
causal relation between the two is suggested. This is not to
say the local war role of carriers is the only mission.
Indeed it is not. But it is one of the major reasons Soviet
decisionmakers chose to build them.
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II. HISTORY OF SOVIET THOUGHT ON AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
A. INTRODUCTION
Although at times poor economic conditions and the lack
of technology played a part in the Soviet decision not to
build aircraft carriers, it is this writer's contention that
the primary reason for Soviet reluctance to construct these
ships was doctrinal. During the early years, the Soviet
Union was economically too weak to support such large ship
construction. However, once the economy had improved and
Stalin's plans for industrial progress were underway, the
means to build large ships and carriers were available.
Nevertheless, the Soviets showed no interest. Khrushchev was
later averse to large ship construction and wanted a missile
and submarine-based fleet. So again, the opportunity for
building aircraft carriers was not realized by the USSR. The
explanation for this disinterest in aircraft carriers must
rest on an examination of Soviet doctrine. Throughout this
entire period Soviet naval doctrine, under the aegis of Soviet
military doctrine, remained defensive with Soviet naval forces
tethered to the homeland within range of land-based aircraft.
Therefore at this time, a strike aircraft carrier, no matter
how capable Russia was of producing one, was superfluous.
12
B. INTERWAR SOVIET IDEAS ON AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
Prior to the Third Five Year Plan (1937-1941), there were
few Soviet advocates of large surface ship construction
outside of select navy circles. Though several Soviet naval
leaders, after viewing the development of the aircraft carrier
in the British, American and Japanese navies during the inter-
war period, understood the importance these ships would play
in future wars, the Soviet Union was economically too weak
and technologically deficient to embark of a major ship-
building program until the mid-1930's. The immediate post
Brest-Litovsk Russia was on the verge of economic collapse
and facing serious threats to governmental survival . The
ascendancy of the Bolsheviks via a palace coup and Russia's
humiliating withdrawal from World War I incited a civil war
which would engulf the country for the next two years. Even
before the civil war had ended, British, French, and American
troops intervened in the new Soviet state, and a newly
established Poland invaded in an attempt to annex the Ukraine.
The debilitating effects of years of war coupled with the
revolutionary economic policies of the Bolsheviks facilitated
the near collapse of the Soviet economy in the early 1920's.
Sharp decreases in industrial and agricultural production
fomented popular dissatisfaction inspiring numerous peasant
uprisings and encouraging worker discontent. The Kronstadt
Mutiny of February and March 1921 led to the liberalization
of certain sectors of the economy under the auspices of the
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New Economic Plan (NEP) . This temporary retreat from
communism was necessary for economic rehabilitation.
Securing the Bolshevik "homeland" compelled the Soviets
to formulate their own military doctrine and establish the
forces to implement it. According to the Party stalwarts,
such a strategy should be patterned after the military
experiences of partisan warfare devised during the Great
Civil War and distantly divorced from that of the capitalist
countries. [Ref. 1: p. 19] Moreover, it was thought that the
limited utility demonstrated by ships-of - 1 ine during World
War I was indicative of their impending decline. Skepticism
arose concerning command of distant seas as a viable naval
strategy in future crises. Thus dreadnoughts were neither
sought nor required to defend the water boundaries of the
Soviet Union.
The Soviet Navy was so weakened by years of warfare and
neglect that it was forced to adopt a purely defensive
strategy. This sad state of affairs was reflected in the
1921 decision by the Commission for the reorganization of
the Navy to maintain only one battleship in operational status
while remanding all others to the reserve. [Ref. 2: p. 13]
Advocates of major ship construction were quickly refuted by
superiors with statements such as the following from the
Soviet Navy Chief of Staff in 1921:
Defense of the borders of the State from the water boundary
is the cornerstone of our present day naval policy; for
the time being we will relinquish broader tasks.... Any
14
other interpretation of the direction of naval policy
must be absolutely and categorically refuted as not
corresponding to the economic conditions of the country.
[Ref. 1: p. 7]
In a 1972 Morskoi Sbornik article, Gorshkov described the
pitiful shape of the Soviet Navy immediately after the Great
Civil War. Paraphrasing V.M. Frunze, Gorshkov asserts:
It was the lot of the Navy to sustain particularly severe
blows in the overall course of the Revolution and in the
events of the civil war. As a result of them we lost the
largest and best part of its material, lost a vast number
of experienced and knowledgeable officers who played an
even greater role in the life and work of the Navy than
all of the other forms of weapons, we lost a whole series
of naval bases, and finally we lost the main nucleus of
the other ranks of Red Navy personnel. In short, all
this meant that we had no fleet. [Ref. 2: p. 13]
Much of the Russian Navy had either been destroyed during the
course of World War I or had defected during the civil war
that followed. Major remnants of the Russian Black Seas
Fleet, under the command of the White Rear Admiral Kedrov,
departed the naval bases at Sevastopol and Nikolayev en route
to the Algerian port of Bizerte (then under the French flag)
during October and November 1920. The ships arrived in
Bizerte between December 1920 and February 1921. Several
were used as floating hotels and schools. This fleet also
served as a Russian government in exile until Paris officially
recognized Moscow in October 1924. [Ref. 3: p. 546]
Thus, an economically deficient Russia served as a back-
drop for Soviet military planning during the first two
decades of existence of the Soviet state. Naval ship
construction was closely in tune with economic progress.
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Consequently years of economic recuperation instilled life
into the proponents of a "small war" navy of coastal defense
forces based on submarines, light surface craft and land-based
aircraft, and silenced the Mahanian- inspired admirals of the
"old guard" who espoused the virtues of the dreadnought and
the naval imperative of gaining command of the sea. Hence,
this new doctrine was embraced largely for reasons of economic
expediency. Heavy industry, on which large scale naval
armaments construction so crucially depends, was not yet
capable of supporting the construction of large surface
combatants, aircraft carriers or otherwise. This new naval
defensive strategy was accepted by the Soviet leadership in
the 1920' s and it continued to dominate naval thinking into
the mid 1930' s when economic development was advanced enough
to support a major naval construction effort.
Since Great Britain, a major naval power, was viewed as
the most likely adversary in any future war, the Soviet
government undertook prudent steps to defend against seaborne
attack. Significant economic development during the First
Five Year Plan enabled the construction of several major
surface vessels during the Second Five Year Plan. During this
period, the government allotted funds for the modernization
of several battleships left relatively undamaged by the war,
and the construction of six heavy cruisers of the Kirov class.
Moreover, submarines and light surface forces were also
constructed and, by the end of the Second Five Year Plan,
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the Soviet Union possessed the largest submarine fleet in
the world. [Ref. 4: p. 220] It is doubtful the construction
of aircraft carriers was seriously considered during this
period. Instead, Stalin was content to strengthen his
coastal defensive forces and army, and broaden Russia's
heavy industrial base.
In 1937 Stalin set out to construct a much more powerful
navy. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov at the first session
of the Supreme Soviet voiced the necessity for an ocean-going
navy stating, "The mighty Soviet power must have a navy both
on sea and ocean commensurate with its interests and worthy
of our great cause." [Ref. 5: p. 142] Admiral Kuznetsov,
then Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy described the
proposed shipbuilding program for the Third Five Year Plan
in his memoirs:
It was decided to build battleships, heavy cruisers, and
other classes of surface warships; that is a big surface
navy. A large number of submarines were also to be
built. Not excluded either was the construction of
aircraft carriers; rather they were only postponed to
the last year of the [Third] Five Year Plan. This was
explained I recall by the complexities of construction
of this class and the aircraft designed especially for
them. [Ref. 1: p. 31]
Thus according to Kuznetsov, the construction of aircraft
carriers was apparently approved by Stalin and the Defense
Ministry. Soviet naval analysts indicate that the
construction of four aircraft carriers was planned with the
first keel to be laid down in 1942 and all scheduled for
completion by 1948. [Ref. 1: p. 32] But events discussed
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later in this chapter raise doubts as to the veracity of
claims that Soviet carriers were solidly planned into the
Soviet defense budget for this period. Kuznetsov even admits
that Stalin held grave reservations about the decision.
[Ref. 1: p. 32]
Stalin's support for large ships, especially battleships
and cruisers, is undeniable. According to Admiral Kuznetsov,
"Stalin had a special and curious passion for heavy cruisers."
[Ref. 1: p. 34] But a curious passion was not the only thing
that convinced Stalin to embark on a large scale naval
rearmament campaign. The London Naval Treaty of 193.6, although
signed by many of the Western naval powers, was stillborn
due to the refusal of one of its major participants, Japan,
to sign the treaty, thereby inciting an unlimited naval arms
buildup between the major naval powers of the time. The
impotent London Naval Treaty and the 1922 Washington Naval
Treaty preceding it had limited the naval armaments of the
major capitalist countries; hence working in Moscow's favor.
[Ref. 3: p. 370] Self-imposed limits on naval armaments and
a Germany still hampered by Versailles ensured that the naval
gap between the Soviet Union and its potential adversaries
would not increase substantially. However, the tacit
expiration of the London Naval Treaty in 1936 heralded an
unconstrained naval armaments buildup which threatened,
unquestionably, to leave the Red Navy far behind. Moreover,
in March 1935, Germany formally denounced the clauses of the
Treaty of Versailles concerning German disarmament, announcing
that her army would be increased to 36. divisions.*
Furthermore, in March 1936, Hitler announced the
repudiation of the Locarno Pacts** and soon thereafter re-
occupied the Rhineland. These two events, coupled with
British and French inaction in the face of German aggressiveness,
convinced Stalin of German bellicosity and of the imperative
of military strength. Additionally, the civil war in Spain
was going poorly for the Soviet-supported Loyalists providing
inarguable evidence of Moscow's ineptness at influencing
events not immediately adjacent to Soviet borders. With
limited capabilities to project power, Stalin could do little
more than file a letter of protest in the 1938 sinking of a
Soviet merchant ship in the Mediterranean Sea by an Italian
submarine. [Ref. 1: p. 27] By 1937, Stalin had become in-
creasingly concerned about the possibilities of war with both
Germany and Japan; hence presenting Moscow with the unenviable
task of conducting war on its east and west fronts simultane-
ously. The November 1936 conclusion of the German- Japanese
Anti-Communist Pact demonstrated Japanese antagonisms for the
Soviet Union. Between 1935 and 1939, numerous border incidents
threatened to trigger a Soviet- Japanese war. The Battle at
*Germany had been limited by the Treaty of Versailles to
an army of no more than 100,000 men and a navy of six major
ships and no submarines.
**The Locarno Pact, signed in October 1923, included a
treaty of mutual guarantee of the post World War I Franco-German
and Belgo-German frontiers. The pact was signed by France,
Germany and Belgium with Britain and Italy as guarantors.
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Changkufeng Hill in the summer of 1938 underscored the risks
of full scale confrontation. Stalin prepared for war.
The Red Navy, long neglected, received a massive infusion
of funds for its revitalization. Thus, it is no surprise that
Soviet naval leaders greeted the start of the Third Five Year
Plan with renewed optimism. A shipyard rehabilitation effort
conducted during the Second Five Year Plan had established
the foundation for a large ship construction program. More-
over, during the mid-1950s, other countries embarked on naval
rearmament programs. The Soviets observed that by 1937 the
British were in the process of laying down the first of six
new aircraft carriers of the Illustrious class. The
Illustrious
,
scheduled for completion in 1940, would have a
displacement of 23,000 tons. Additionally, the British were
continuing the construction of another aircraft carrier; the
Ark Royal
,
a 22,600 ton ship to be completed in 1938. [Ref. 6]
These new aircraft carriers would augment an existing force
of six bringing the total to thirteen by the early 1940s.
Furthermore, by the late 1930s, the British were engaged in
a major battleship construction program with the laying down
of two new classes; the 40,000 ton Lion and the 35,000 ton
King George . Both series, consisting of four and six units
respectively, were targeted for completion in the early 1940s.
The British Royal Navy was not the only navy in the midst
of a substantial naval rearmament campaign. The Japanese,
believing they needed to strengthen their position in the
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Pacific vis-a-vis the British and the Americans, inaugurated
a massive shipbuilding program in the mid-1950s. By 1937,
Japan possessed five aircraft carriers, ranging in size from
the 7,000 ton Ruuio to the 27,000 ton Kaga
,
and was in the
process of building "two new aircraft carriers each displacing
10,500 tons. In addition to carriers, the Japanese had plans
to construct four new 40,000 ton battleships. These new
dreadnoughts were scheduled to be laid down in 1938-39 and
programmed for completion in the early 1940' s.
Germany, another potential Soviet adversary and free from
the trappings of Versailles,- was also busy rearming its navy
under the aegis of Plan Z which envisioned constructing 15
battleships, 35 cruisers, 4 aircraft carriers and 267 submarines
[Ref. 7: p. 555] In 1957 Germany started the construction of
its first aircraft carrier; the 19,000 ton Graf Zeppelin .
Moreover, Berlin was building two classes of battleships; the
26,000 ton Scharnhorst class and the 55,000 ton Bismark .
Stalin, confronted with the above evidence, may have felt
pressured to begin his own naval construction program. But the
Soviet Union lacked the technical expertise and the modern
construction methods to design and build ships of large
displacement quickly without foreign assistance. With naval
limitations removed and potential enemies embarked on major
naval building efforts, Stalin attempted to strike a deal with
US shipbuilders for the design and manufacture of naval combat
vessels in the United States for delivery to the Soviet Union.
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Research of the documents concerning this event reveals that
the Soviet Union vociferously expressed its interest in US
manufactured battleships and destroyers. However, Soviet
desires, relative to the construction of aircraft carriers,
were more ambiguous and less intense. Joseph C. Green, then
Chief, Office of Arms and Munitions Control, in a letter to
the Carp Export and Import Corportation (intermediaries
representing the Soviet government) makes reference to earlier
correspondence originated from Carp Corporation in which the
latter requests "non-Confidential designs, plans, working
drawings and specification of such vessels as the USS
Lexington " and two additional old battleship designs. This
is the only reference to aircraft carriers to be found in the
text of correspondence included in the encyclopedic Foreign
Relation of the United States. Even if other materials
associated with this matter exist, which may or may not refer
more often to Soviet desires to obtain working plans for US
aircraft carriers, the scarcity of mention in the Department
of State publication, which should include the most important
documents of the time, suggests that the Soviet Union was not
strongly interested in building aircraft carriers during this
time period. Cordell Hull, then U.S. Secretary of State,
describing this episode in his memoirs offers no mention of
a Soviet request for design specifications for U.S. aircraft
carriers. [Ref. 8: p. 743] Over a period of more than
twenty-six months of negotiations with the US only one
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reference to aircraft carrier construction was noted in the
available correspondence concerning this episode in Russo-
American interaction. The apparent scarcity of interest
evident on the Soviet part leads this author to conclude
Soviet decisionmakers (Stalin) were not serious in constructing
aircraft carriers for the Soviet fleet during this time period.
If they were, it seems that they would have put forth a more
concerted effort to obtain plans and design specifications
for them.
It is clear, however, that the Soviets were indeed
interested in the US design specifications for a modern
battleship and requested on many occasions that US shipbuilders
construct such a vessel for export to the Soviet Union. From
the available documents, the Soviets originally wanted a
battleship displacing 62,000 tons and sporting 18" guns [Ref.
9: p. 683]. However, both criteria were unacceptable from the
US view because they exceeded the 1936 London Naval Treaty
limits on battleships (35,000 tons and 16" guns).
It is likely the major impetus behind the Russian attempt
to purchase warship designs from the US was Soviet concern
for another war in Europe. The Soviet Ambassador to the US
voiced this fear during the negotiations when asking if his
government "should place a contract in the United States for
the construction of a war vessel the Neutrality Act would
prevent delivery of the vessel if at the time of its completion
his country should be at war." [Ref. 9: p. 489] On several
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occasions through the course of the negotiations the Soviet
ambassador expressed this concern. Though the State
Department and President Roosevelt supported the Soviet request,
vocal opposition from the US Navy Department and the worsening
European geopolitical situation forced stalemated negotiations.
The signing of the Russo-German nonaggression pact, the Soviet
invasion of eastern Poland and the Russo-Finnish war forced
the termination of the aforementioned negotiations.
According to Robert Herrick, Stalin yearned for a large
surface fleet to garner international prestige and to deter
aggression. [Ref. 1: p. 35] Originally Soviet desires to
acquire a battleship displacing 62,000 tons and armed with 18"
guns, which was nearly twice as large as any existing battle-
ship, supports this conclusion. Such a man-of-war would
certainly command the attention and the respect of other
major powers, thus aiding in Soviet diplomacy. Moreover,
with the climate of war fast approaching, a battleship of this
size would serve as a visible deterrent to potential adver-
saries contemplating aggression against the Soviet state.
Though Kuznetsov in his memoirs states that aircraft carriers
were indeed planned in the defense budgets of the Third and
Fourth Five Year Plans, the final decision, and hence Stalin's
blessing, to build aircraft carriers may never have been made.
On another occasion describing naval armament plans for the
same period, Kuznetsov seems to contradict his earlier
testimony, stating "the program [Third Five Year Plan] made
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no provision at all for carriers." [Ref. 1: p. 32] Indeed,
Kuznetsov has admitted on a number of occasions that Stalin
was averse to the construction of aircraft carriers.
In criticizing Stalin's program of large surface ship
construction which excluded aircraft carriers, Kuznetsov
wrote
:
Visualize for a minute that the programs were to have
been completed in the second half of the forties. We
should have had large squadrons with battleships, but....
without a single aircraft carrier. Then how far out to
sea could they have gone?
....Stalin, who usually reckoned with the opinion of
the experts, tended for some unexplained reason to
underrate the role of aircraft carriers. I had repeated
proof of this during discussions on naval affairs,
especially during the approval of naval construction
projects in 1939.... I think all this was due to a tendency
to underestimate the danger to ships from the air. [Ref. 1:
p. 33]
Admiral Gorshkov, writing in 1967, repeated Kuznetsov'
s
accusation that Stalin underestimated the effect of aviation
on combat operations at sea.
Aviation during that period [1939] was assigned relatively
minor roles of reconnaissance with a secondary role of
surface ship protection. For these reasons, no aircraft
carriers were constructed at that time. [Ref. 10: p. 6]
Furthermore, writing in 1976, Gorshkov, in his recollection
of Soviet naval construction during the late prewar years
does not mention any effort to build aircraft carriers. [Ref.
7: p. 348] Explaining the rationale behind the Defense
Ministry's failure to build aircraft carriers, Gorshkov states
In the last prewar years Soviet military thinking was
oriented toward the establishment and employment of
squadrons of major surface ships headed by powerful
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battleships and; cruisers. In this connection, the high
combat capabilities of aircraft as attack forces in naval
warfare were not given sufficient consideration. At the
same time, Soviet military theory being oriented toward
surface ships, was unable to justify the need to have in
its ocean going naval inventory aircraft carriers capable
of providing cover for ships with their weak anti-aircraft
armament beyond the range of shore-based fighter aircraft.
[Ref. 7: p. 348]
Thus according to both Gorshkov and Kuznetsov, the
rationale behind the decision not to construct aircraft
carriers during this juncture was more doctrinal than either
technical or economic. In other words, Stalin did not feel
that aircraft carriers could play any meaningful role in the
overall military doctrine of the Politburo. If war was to
erupt in Europe then the navy would have failed its primary
function; deterrence. In retrospect, Stalin seemed content
to provide only the appearance of deterrence to his navy
rather than the true warfighting capabilities his navy would
require in the event deterrence failed. Though Stalin had
visions of a "Great Red Fleet", he failed to provide it
protection, in the form of sea based air, which would be vital
for operations far from the friendly umbrella of land based
fighter aircraft. Thus, according to Gorshkov, "....even our
big surface fleet, which began to be created on the eve of
the war actually was doomed to operating solely in our coastal
waters...." [Ref. 10: p. 7] It appears clear that this is
all Stalin wanted from his navy; to protect the coastal ocean
boundaries of the Soviet Union. To possess the capabilities
to operate far from friendly coasts was not a requirement of
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Stalin's navy. That the Red Navy would not operate far from
Soviet shores was evident in Stalin's retort to Kuznetsov's
request to increase the antiaircraft weapons on board existing
Soviet ships; "We are not going to fight off America's shores."
[Ref. 1: p. 34]
Though it is clear that the Soviet Union never laid down
the keel of an aircraft carrier during the prewar years, the
1939 edition of Jane's World's Fighting Ships reported just
such an event in the pages of that year's issue. According
to the editors of Jane's, the Soviet Union was constructing
not just one aircraft carrier, but two in that year. The
first was alleged to be named Krasnoye Zenamya , displacing
9,000 tons and building in Leningrad. The other was a
converted cruiser, the ex Admiral Kornilov renamed Stalin .




was said to be projected. Jane's continued to list these
ships as aircraft carriers until 1942 when that year's edition
emended its previous error and stated that the Krasnoye Zenamya
was, in fact, never laid down. Furthermore, the Stalin turned
out to be a seaplane carrier in the Black Sea and a cruiser
of the Kirov class, bearing the name Voroshilov , was identi-
fied at the end of the war. This confusion on the part of a
naval journal as prestigious as Jane's suggests three things.
First, in the Soviet Union, a closed society, correct infor-
mation, especially on defense matters, is hard to acquire and
when it does appear is often ambiguous. Second, it suggests
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that the carrier debate within the Soviet Union may have been
extremely vocal during this period and at times transcended
the sacred confines of the Soviet Defense Ministry. Third,
this could have been an attempt at Soviet disinformation; to
convince potential adversaries just over the horizon that the
Soviets were serious about their security, hoping to deter
aggression.
All Soviet capital ship construction halted abruptly with
the German dispatch of operation Barbarossa in June 1941.
Describing this period, Gorshkov states:
By the decisions of the State Committee for Defense,
adopted in July 1941, construction of major ships
requiring large expenditures of labor, long periods
of time, and materials, equipment, and weapons which
were in short supply was suspended. [Ref. 7: p. 352]
As a result, the Fourth Five Year Plan was never implemented.
History shows that the Red Navy played a relatively minor
role in World War II and was not a decisive factor in turning
the tide of battle in Europe in favor of the Soviet Union.
Although Admiral Gorshkov extols Soviet naval achievements
during the Great Patriotic War in his book Sea Power of the
State
,
he nevertheless agrees that the basic mission of the
Red Navy was to support the Red Army.
The operations of our fleet against the sea foe formed
an important part in the struggle as a whole. However,
its principal efforts from the first few days of the
war were aimed at solving the most important task- -to
assist ground troops, bearing the brunt of the defense
of the country from the attacking enemy, and whose
operations in the end determined the outcome of the war.
[Ref. 11: p. 144]
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But this was exactly the intended role assigned to the Navy
under the unified military doctrine of the Soviet armed forces
In order to support the ground war, Stalin felt it imperative
that the fleet operate close to the shore, under the land
based air umbrella, and not far out to sea. In Stalin's mind,
navies played a deterrent role and, when war came, they would
not be decisive.
C. POSTWAR SOVIET IDEAS ON AIRCRAFT CARRIERS- - STALIN PERIOD
The replacement of the battleship with the aircraft
carrier as the new capital ship of modern ocean going navies
was grasped by many Soviet naval leaders after World War II.
This conclusion was evident in many post war writings con-
cerning future naval combat operations. An article in a 1946
issue of the Soviet military journal Military Thought asserts:
The conditions of modern war at sea demand the mandatory
participation and the combat operations of the navies
of powerful carrier forces, using them for striking
devastating blows against the naval forces of the enemy
as well as for the contest with his aviation. Both at
sea and near one's bases these tasks can only be carried
out by carrier aviation. [Ref. 4: p. 222]
Sea battles in the Pacific, such as Midway and Coral Sea,
fought with sea based aircraft as the primary weapons without
having the two opposing task forces get within gun range of
their battleships, changed the methods and tactics of warfare
at sea and ushered in the era of the aircraft carrier and the
demise of the battleship. Admiral Gorshkov, describing World
War II naval combat operations in a 1963 issue of the Soviet
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naval journal Morskoi Sbornik
,
emphasized the importance of
strong air cover for surface ship operations far from
friendly bases:
In all cases when line ships and cruisers were found to
be without strong air cover, enemy aviation was able to
reach them quite easily. When cruising in the ocean or
open sea, large surface ships could count on success
only when they operated in coordination with aircraft
carriers. [Ref. 1: p. 55]
It was also clearly demonstrated during the World War II that
even when operating within the friendly radius of landbased
fighter aviation, surface ships were attacked, either badly
damaged or sunk before friendly air cover could be mustered
in their defense.
Though the importance of aircraft carriers in modern
combat at sea was clear to Soviet naval leaders of that
period, this view was not shared by Stalin. Kuznetsov writes,
"The surprising thing is that his [Stalin's] view on this
matter [importance of seabased aircraft] did not change, even
after the Great Patriotic War." [Ref. 1: p. 34] Stalin's view
of navies had not changed. Their major utility was derived
in peacetime as a deterrent and as a tool for international
prestige enhancement. In war, they assumed the defensive and
were assigned the mission of supporting the Red Army. Command
of the sea was not a goal of Stalin' navy; thus, his lack of
interest in the construction of aircraft carriers. With
deterrence and prestige in mind, his postwar naval construction
program was designed to reestablish a large ship surface navy
based on cruisers.
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Not only was the Soviet Union materially devastated by
war but a large porportion of its traditional maritime popu-
lation had been lost with the decoupling of the Baltic
republics and Finland from the USSR after the war. The post-
war balance of power revealed that the Soviet Union's most
likely adversaries in any future conflict, the United States
and Great Britain, possessed massive and very capable naval
forces. Stalin was convinced that in order to prevent the
Western naval powers from exploiting apparent Soviet weaknesses
on the seas, he must build a highly visible large surface ship
navy; not to necessarily compete for command of the seas, but
to serve as a deterrent to perceived Western plans for
aggression. According to a former Soviet naval officer
Nicholas A. Shadrin, this long term naval construction plan
envisioned light cruisers and destroyers serving as screening
and supporting units to the major striking units of the large
fleet; the carrier task forces. [Ref. 1: p. 61] Apparently,
from Shadrin' s testimony, a decision to construct aircraft
carriers at some future time was made in 1949. [Ref. 4: p. 222
However, since the war left the Soviet Union economically
drained, the construction of aircraft carriers would have to
wait until the devastation of the war had been repaired, the
economy restored and large ship building expertise acquired.
Hence cruiser construction would take precedence. As Gorshkov,
in each edition of his book Sea Power of the State infers, the
keel of an aircraft carrier was never laid down in Soviet
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shipyards during the late Stalin years. According to Shadrin,
Stalin avoided personally endorsing a project fraught with
dubious prospects "until and unless the success of the project
had been demonstrated by life itself." [Ref. 1: p. 64] It
could be that Stalin issued the order to proceed with research
into aircraft carrier construction, but never gave a final
affirmative to commence building.
The Soviet Union did, indeed, possess an aircraft carrier
at the end of World War II; the German Graf Zeppelin , captured
by the Soviets at the end of the conflict. As Soviet armies
approached the Oder, the ship was scuttled in shallow water
by her crew. She was also hit several times by artillery fire
and sustained minor damage. After the German surrender, the
Graf Zeppelin was floated and towed to Swinemuende on the Oder
It seems plausible to expect that if the Soviets were truly
concerned about the acquisition of aircraft carriers for their
fleet they certainly would have taken better care of the one
that happened to be in their possession. However, overloaded
with war booty, she sank in rough Baltic seas on her way to
Leningrad in 1947. [Ref. 12: p. 647]
D. POSTWAR SOVIET IDEAS ON AIRCRAFT CARRIERS- -KHRUSHCHEV
PERIOD
The death of Stalin and the ascension of Khrushchev as
CPSU Party Secretary signalled a revision of Soviet per-
ceptions of sea power. Large surface ship advocates were
compelled to renounce their "archaic" way of thinking and to
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embrace a new naval strategy espousing the virtues of a small
defensive navy consisting of light surface craft, submarines,
and land based aviation. These Khrushchevean military thinkers
denounced the strategy of command of the sea and large surface
forces, including carriers, required to implement it. Though
this seemed to be an abrupt and radical change from the
policies which governed naval procurement of the early 1950 's,
it nevertheless was indicative of the trend in Soviet public
spending which would become even more apparent as the
Khrushchev era gained momentum.
A small navy concept was in total compliance with
Khrushchev's goal of increasing the economic viability of the
Soviet consumer. Shortly after Stalin's death the independent
Naval Ministry was abolished and the Red Navy was subordinated
to the Army. In 1955 Admiral Kuznetsov presented a naval
construction plan which included substantial cruiser and
destroyer production. It is interesting to note that this
plan, submitted by a staunch proponent of large ships and one
who had criticized Stalin for not constructing aircraft
carriers, did not include aircraft carriers. This may suggest
that Kuznetsov believed such a request would have been met
with such ridicule that he did not even attempt to tender it.
Hence, Kuznetsov' s apparent omission of aircraft carriers was
indicative of the political climate in which it was offered.
The political leadership was averse to carrier construction.
Moreover, Khrushchev referred to advocates of carriers as
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"loudmouths". The development of the Soviet air force and
missile weaponry was accelerated at the expense of major
surface ship construction. According to Khrushchev, "any
future war should be won in the air and not the sea." [Ref.
13: p. 26] Khrushchev states that he took full responsibility
for converting the Navy from the cruiser-centered deterrent
fleet advocated by Stalin, to primarily a light force de-
fensive force based on submarines and missiles. Submarines
according to Khrushchev, were not only cheaper to "build and
operate-
-
[they were] also a more formidable and effective
weapon." [Ref. 13: p. 30] Though Khrushchev expressed a
desire for aircraft carriers, he emphasized that the Soviet
Union could not afford to build them while at the same time
financing other, more important, defense programs. Khrushchev
insisted that since the Soviet Union was not an expansionist
power, he had no requirement for an offensive navy:
We are a socialist country; in accordance with Lenin's
principle of peaceful coexistence, we are against
imperialist wars and we do not aspire to occupy other
countries. Therefore we have no need for those vessels
that are used by countries like the United States to
pursue aggressive and imperialist goals." [Ref. 13: p. 31]
Admiral Kuznetsov*, one of the staunchest proponents of
Stalin's large ship fleet was demoted and replaced by Admiral
Gorshkov in 1955. Consequently, the postwar naval construction
*Khrushchev was never really impressed with Admiral
Kuznetsov. He accused him of "looking at the present through
eyes of the past", and of lacking the ability to critically
assess the correct position of the navy. [Ref. 13: p. 26]
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program was redirected concentrate on the construction of
light surface forces and submarine construction was accelerated
The Skoryy large destroyer program was terminated in 1954 with
completion of 72 ships, ten short of the planned 82 units.
The Sverdlov light cruiser line was terminated at fourteen
units in 1956, ten short of a programmed 24 units. In a 1967
article in Morskoi Sbornik
,
Gorshkov described the atmosphere
which surrounded many of the top military thinkers during the
early Khrushchev period:
It turned out, unfortunately, that as we had some very
influential "authorities" who considered that with the
appearance of the atomic weapons the navy had completely
lost its value as a branch of the armed forces. According
to these views all of the basic missions in a future war
allegedly could be fully resolved without the participation
of the navy.... At that time it was frequently asserted that
only missiles emplaced in ground launching sites were
required for the destruction of surface striking forces
and even submarines. [Ref. 10: p. 18]
After the replacement of Kuznetsov by Gorshkov no more was
heard in favor of the actual construction of aircraft carriers
for the next twelve years. With the dismissal of Kuznetsov
in 1955, the navy lost its most vocal proponent for the
construction of large surface ships, including aircraft
carriers, and the old guard which pushed command of the sea
role for the Soviet Navy was replaced by "light navy" pro-
ponents which espoused the economic and defensive virtues of
a naval "small war" doctrine.
It was in 1954 when the Politburo decided to make the
shift from "obsolete" surface ships to a navy based primarily
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on submarines and land based aircraft [Ref. 1: p. 75]. This
shift came less than a year after Stalin's death. The
apparent ease with which this transition was made demonstrates
just how little support proponents of large surface ships had
in the Politburo and Defense Ministry. Thus, it is doubtful
that aircraft carrier construction would have commenced even
if Stalin had not died in 1953.
Khrushchev criticized Stalin for expending limited
resources on the expansion of the Red Navy, rather than
funnelling needed capital into the expansion of the air and
missile forces. [Ref. 13: p. 19] Khrushchev often expressed
his contempt for conventionally armed surface ships and the
tremendous expense involved in maintaining these forces in an
operational state.
We relegated our surface fleet to an auxilliary function,
primarily for coastal defense. We built PT boats, coast
guard cutters, and subchasers armed with depth charges.
The next question was what to do with the destroyers
and cruisers that we already had. Some of them had been
built as long ago as World War I. They were creaky old
slopokes, about as much good to us as a bunch of old
shoes. With thousands of crewmembers, one of these ships
cost an enormous amount of money to keep afloat. [Ref. 13:
p. 26]
Though Khrushchev was clearly not an advocate of an ocean
going surface navy, he impugned Stalin for not providing air-
craft carriers to protect the latter' s large surface ships
commenting in his memoirs that "a navy without aircraft
carriers is no navy at all." [Ref. 13: p. 20] This apparent
contradiction between words and deeds suggests that Khrushchev
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although not advocating carrier construction, criticized
Stalin for his improvidence in not providing his ocean going
forces with critical air support. But it was clear due to
early cuts in large ship construction that Khrushchev had no
intention of constructing an ocean going surface fleet nor
did his "small navy" defensive doctrine demand it. Nevertheless,
Khrushchev laments that he did not have any aircraft carriers
in his fleet referring to them as the second most important
weapon (behind the submarine) in any modern navy. [Ref. 13:
p. 27] Khrushchev was not willing to expend the enormous sums
to construct this type of weapon system. These capital
expenditures no doubt would have to come from other higher
priority defense items, such as missile and aircraft development.
Hence, simple desires do not necessarily translate into sound
defense or political policy. The Red Navy, for all practical
purposes, was configured to operate as a coastal defensive
force. Protection of the maritime approaches to the Soviet
Union was its primary mission; a policy which, according to
Khrushchev, did not require aircraft carriers. Khrushchev
was a firm proponent of the revolution in scientific and
technical affairs which changed the methods of conducting
warfare. Results of several seminars, convened by the Soviet
General Staff of 1957-8 concluded that the "introduction of
the nuclear weapons and the missile had brought about radical
changes in all aspects of warfare, forcing revisions in basic
concepts." [Ref. 14: p. 41]
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Khrushchev, during the early years of his term, was
motivated to cut the Defense Ministry's share of the budget
in order to strengthen the consumer sector of the Soviet
economy which had suffered years of neglect in the face of
massive military expenditures. By May 1957, the Soviet armed
forces had been reduced from 5,763,000 men at the time of
Stalin's death, to a little less than 4 million. Since the
army dominated General Staff would not receive favorably major
reductions in the army's share of the budget, Khrushchev looked
to the navy for defense reductions. As previously mentioned,
cruiser and destroyer building programs were either ended or
curtailed sharply in the mid 1950' s. In the era of the
scientific and technological revolution, nuclear- tipped
cruise missiles would serve as a reasonably inexpensive
counter to the aircraft carrier centered strike fleets of the
United States. Heavy cruisers, Khrushchev thought, were only
good for show pieces, to impress foreign visitors. [Ref. 13:
p. 33] Although he referred to submarines as "floating metal
cigars," he nevertheless called them the supreme weapon. [Ref.
13: p. 33]
With the adoption of a navy based on light surface forces
and submarines, supported by land-based aviation, there simply
was no role for large surface ships. They were considered an
expensive luxury. Some of the reasons for opposition to the
construction of aircraft carriers were voiced by leading
Soviet military and political authorities during this period.
38
Marshal Georgii Zhukov, then Minister of Defense, commented
that aircraft carriers could be employed only for "aggressive
first-strike missions" against weak states. [Ref. 4: p. 224]
According to Zhukov, since the Soviet Union was a peace-loving
state, it had no aggressive designs on the rest of the world.
Thus, carriers, which were considered tools of aggression,
simply did not fit the Soviet scheme of things. Marshal Andre
Eremenko stressed the vulnerability of such large ships when
he noted in 1960 that, "with the emergence of the missile and
of nuclear weapons, even aircraft carriers have become so
vulnerable that their use appears to be inexpedient." [Ref. 4
p. 224]
The introduction of new seabased strike capabilities by
the United States during the mid to late 1950' s, such as
carrier based nuclear armed aircraft and submarine launched
ballistic missiles, each capable of launching nuclear strikes
against the heart of the Soviet Union from areas far out to
sea, did not excite the Soviet leadership into embarking on a
major effort to construct large strike aircraft carriers. The
Soviet Union did not attempt to counter US strike carriers
with strike carriers of their own. Nor did it appear in
Moscow's interest to put Washington in an analogous situation
with the deployment of several Soviet strike carriers off US
shores .
The elevation of the Polaris as the primary seabased
threat to the Soviet Union, replacing the strike carrier,
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appeared to be the major impetus behind the Soviet decision
to send more and larger ASW capable surface ships to sea and
explained the renewed interest in the production of large
surface vessels able to survive for extended periods of time
in a hostile environment. [Ref. 4: p. 225] The construction
and deployment of the Moskva CHG appeared to be an attempt to
directly counter US Polaris deployments in the Norwegian and
Mediterranean seas. The Moskva program was ended in 1968 after
the construction of only two units which initially appeared
as an honest attempt to operate forward deployed ASW assets
in the loiter areas of U.S. SSBNs. [Ref. 4: p. 227] Still,
during this period of operating surface units in forward
deployed areas, Soviet military leaders remained unanimous
in their criticism of strike carriers. Admiral Gorshkov in
a July 1962 Pravda article argued that aircraft carriers "like
battleships which have become obsolete are irrevocably passing
into oblivion. Their place is now being taken by missile-
carrying vessels." [Ref. 4: p. 226] Similarly, Admiral
Isakov emphasized the vulnerability of aircraft carriers.
"My opinion is that these colossal aircraft carriers would be
floating corpses should they be used against a powerful
opponent who has modern means of conducting war." [Ref. 1:
p. 121] Furthermore, in a 1964 book entitled Avianostsy, the
three coauthors stress the limited utility of aircraft
carriers in certain tactical situations and emphasized that
they are restricted in wartime operations by "weather and
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the efficiency of the supply system." [Ref. 4: p. 226]
Aircraft carriers were also criticized for the tremendous
outlay of resources required for their construction; thus
they were viewed as simply not cost effective in an era when
relatively small naval forces armed with "long range missiles
and torpedoes with powerful warheads, [could] successfully
conduct combat operations ...against carrier forces...
destroying them in any part of the world ocean." [Ref. 4:
p. 226] Thus, according to Soviet military planners, in the
modern era of the scientific and technical revolution there
existed less expensive and more effective ways of combating
the Western carrier menace. Hence, a Soviet strike carrier
was perceived as unnecessary in the overall Soviet defensive
scheme
.
The success of the 2,500 nautical mile Polaris A-3 system
in 1964 and the announcement by the US of the even longer
range and more capable Poseidon missile system in 1965 may
have increased Soviet naval desires for a large ocean going
navy, capable of operating great distances from friendly
shores, positioned to counter the increasing western sea based
strategic threat. However, advances in ASW technology lagged
far behind the ships needed to carry them to sea and U.S.
technological advances in SLBMs added to the difficulty of
the problem. This shortcoming may have convinced the Soviet
military thinkers of the futility of expending large amounts
of limited resources in an enterprise which realistically
41
offered only limited chances for success. However, US
advances in carrier based aviation and the SLBMs in the 1960's
did not force the Soviets to build strike aircraft carriers.
The official line on aircraft carriers remained unchanged.
Gorshkov, in a 1967 article for Morskoi Sbornik
,
still
predicted the inevitable decline of strike carriers and
asserted that they were limited to "local wars against weak
states." [Ref. 4: p. 227] Although other articles authored
by a number of Gorshkov' s subordinates during this period
seemed to advocate the construction of aircraft carriers, the
official party line, as expressed by the Soviet Navy Commander
in Chief, did not deviate throughout the 1960s. [Ref. 4: p.
229] Aircraft carriers were perceived as extremely vulnerable
to modern weapons, egregiously expensive and imbued with
limited utility in major wars.
Through the 1960s, Soviet naval strategy, as in the past
remained defensive in nature; more concerned with protecting
sea approaches to the USSR than projecting Soviet military
power and influence to distant areas. Characteristic of the
Party line with respect to aircraft carriers was the 1968
edition of Military Strategy . In this work, Sokolovsky et
.
al. portrayed aircraft carriers as extremely vulnerable to
nuclear strikes and claimed this vulnerability increases
"during ocean crossings, during refueling, and launch and
recovery cycles." [Ref. 15: p. 300] Sokolovsky went so far
as to predict the "extinction", of not only aircraft carriers,
42
but also surface ships per se [Ref. 15: p. 203] and reemphasized
that "submarines have become the main striking forces of our
Navy." [Ref. 15: p. 301]
E. CONCLUSION
Some of the anti-carrier rhetoric espoused by Soviet
authors during the 1950s and 60s may have been merely pro-
paganda to rationalize Soviet naval weaknesses vis-a-vis the
West. In retrospect it appears clear that although many
variables played a part in the Soviet decision not to build
a true strike aircraft carrier, including, at times, economic
and technical constraints, the decisive criteria was doctrinal.
Strike aircraft carriers did not fit comfortably into the
Soviet naval thinking with its emphasis on the defensive.
However, the decade of the 1970s would usher in a new
era of Soviet power vis-a-vis its most likely antagonists.
Being the apparent beneficiaries of a hesitant America
unwilling to become involved in another Third World quagmire,
and of a massive nuclear and conventional weapons buildup,
the Soviet Union was imbued with a sense of security hereto-
fore unknown in its history. This perception of security
would, in time, be translated into a sense of confidence in
its abilities to participate in international events far
removed from Russian shores. Russia, long a continental power,
emerged as a global power during the early 1970s. This new-
found status may have compelled the Politburo to shift from
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a more or less passive role in the developing world to a more
active, offensive-minded role.
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III. EVOLUTION OF SOVIET LOCAL WAR DOCTRINE
A. INTRODUCTION
Over the years Soviet local war doctrine evolved to pro-
vide for a greater Soviet military role in local conflict.
Following their early doctrine, the Soviets avoided local
conflict, largely because of fears that local wars could lead
to a world war for which the Soviets were ill -prepared . How-
ever, in the early to mid 1970s after they reached strategic
nuclear parity with the U.S., Soviet philosophy began to
change. A greater willingness to assume a military role in
local conflicts resulted from a shift in their belief that
local wars lead necessarily to nuclear confrontations. There
was also a dawning realization for greater military involvement
to protect socialist gains outside of the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. This new interest in local conflict led
naturally to a desire for the heretofore unnecessary strike
aircraft carrier.
B. EARLY SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN EXTERNAL CRISES
The Bolsheviks were extremely active in exporting their
revolution even before they had completely consolidated their
own power in Russia. In the first few months after the
Petrograd coup, the Leninists supplied small arms and
ammunition to the abortive communist coup in Finland. The
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Red Army nearly became directly involved in supporting Bela
Kun's Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919. However, before
Red Army troops could be dispatched they were redirected to
the Urals to counter a White offensive. Between 1919 and 1924,
the Soviet Union supported a number of other communist and
worker uprisings: the Berlin Sparticists and the Bavarian
Soviet in 1919; the Maerzaktion in 1920, the attempted
revolution by the Bulgarian Communist Party in 1923, and the
Estonia coup in 1924. All failed, in part, due to Moscow's
inability to provide necessary assistance [Ref. 16: p. 8].
Lenin, realizing the chances of overthrowing capitalism
with a frontal assault were dim, conceived a strategy designed
to strike at the imperialists from the rear by fomenting
national insurrections in their colonial domains. [Ref. 16:
p. 8] Since the colonial revolution would have to be a
bourgeois-democratic movement, Lenin urged the relatively
weak communist parties to cooperate with them in a "united
front." However, Marxist-Leninist ideology was not the only
driving force behind Soviet foreign policy during the early
development of the Soviet state. More traditional world power
concerns also occupied the Kremlin's attentions. Moscow's
signing of a treaty of friendship with the Turkish nationalist
leader Mustafa Kemal Pasha in 1921 who was then at war with
the Greek army, was a clear example of early Soviet Realpolitik
Moscow's intent was to weaken further British influence in
the Near East. According to the terms of the above agreement,
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Moscow promised to supply military aid to the Kemal forces.
This was the first instance of a Soviet government providing
military assistance to a foreign polity at war.
Lenin, at the Second Comintern Congress in 1920, stated
that all colonial and semi-colonial nations would experience
a revolution and that this revolution would occur in two
distinct phases. First, a national revolution, lead by the
bourgeoisie, would establish independence from the colonial
yoke. This would be followed by a second phase; a socialist
revolution of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie
democracy resulting in the establishment of a dictatorship
of the proletariate. For Lenin, this sequence was important.
Marxism-Leninism dictated the socialist revolution always
followed the initial bourgeoisie-led struggle for independence
This was the first major Soviet statement about conflict in
the Third World. [Ref. 17: p. 13] But this statement was
immediately challenged by the Indian communist N. M. Roy who
asserted that the national bourgeoisie in the Third World was
too weak and dependent on the colonial powers and thus in-
capable of leading the first phase- of the revolution.
Consequently, the proletariate would have to lead the initial
thrust for independence, bypassing Lenin's first step. Though
each contradicted the other, the Comintern passed resolutions
approving both, reasoning the colonial nations were so far
removed that the apparent contradiction did not matter. [Ref.
17: p. 13] Lenin did not anticipate socialist revolution in
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the Third World happening anytime soon and more pressing
domestic problems and closer issues dominated his attention.
However, Third World revolution did come as early as the
mid 1920's, in China. But by this time, Lenin was medically
incapacitated and the ruling elite was still tethered to
domestic concerns and could not devote much attention to areas
of the world so seemingly distant. Between 1923-1927, the
Soviet Union did provide military material assistance to the
Kuomintang. However, the Shanghai Massacre of the communist
wing of the Kuomintang in 1927 forced a reappraisal of the
Soviet "united front" strategy and further diminished Moscow's
motivation to participate in Third World conflicts. The
latter half of the 1920's witnessed the Stalin-Trotsky suc-
cession struggle and the victor's enunciation of "socialism
in one country" ensured the relegation of Third World concerns
to positions of relatively minor importance. The decade of
the 1930 's revealed a Soviet Union more concerned with internal
matters; collectivization and heavy industrialization. National
security concerns dominated Soviet attention beginning in the
middle 1930 ' s and demanded the further invocation of Soviet
realpolitik. The spreading Sino- Japanese conflict threatened
to impel the Soviet Union into the struggle. Consequently,
ideology notwithstanding, Moscow signed a mutual non-aggression
pact with the Nationalist Chinese in 1937, the same regime
the Kremlin attempted to liquidate in the past. Likewise,
substantial Soviet support for the Republic during the Spanish
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Civil War was a further attempt by Stalin to assemble Moscow,
Paris and London into an anti-facist entente. [Ref. 18: p.
244] Although no Soviet troops were among the Comintern's
40,000 man International Brigade, 2,000 Red Army advisors did
serve in Spain during the course of the conflict. [Ref. 16:
p. 12]
All the conflicts discussed above occurred in regions of
traditional Russian interest in areas relatively close to
Soviet borders. It was not until the mid-1950 's that the
Soviet Union began to expand its influence in regions of the
world lying outside these historical concerns. Third World
issues did not occupy a favored position on the Soviet foreign
policy agenda throughout Stalin's tenure. At the nineteenth
congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1932,
Stalin articulated his "two camp" doctrine, stressing that
the world was divided into a socialist and capitalist camp.
Furthermore, according to Stalin, the emerging nations from
the postwar period were "mere pawns of the former colonial
powers." [Ref. 16: p. 14] Hence, a major Soviet effort to
convert these new governments to socialism was seen as problem
atic. Moreover, throughout Stalin's era, the Third World did
not receive any measureable degree of consideration in Soviet
ideas about war. The dominant issue, by far, was the in-
evitability of war between socialism and imperialism fought
on a world wide stage.
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Stalin classified all wars into four categories: (1) war
in defense of the socialist homeland, (2) civil wars between
the proletariate and the bourgeoisie, (3) national liberation
wars, and (4) wars between imperialist states. Civil wars
could not occur until national liberation wars had been fought
and won by the oppressed people of colonialism. Thus, as did
Lenin before, Stalin assumed the anti-colonial revolution
would take place in two phases, with the bourgeoisie-led war
of independence preceding the proletariate or socialist phase.
Since the proletariate in the developing world was either very
weak or in some cases non-existent, the working class would
have to be strengthened and this would take time.
C. KHRUSHCHEV ERA 1955-1964
Though the developing world played only a minor role in
Soviet foreign policy during the first three and one-half
decades of Soviet rule, in the course of the Khrushchev era
the Third World grew in importance for Soviet foreign policy.
For the new Party Secretary, the developing nations presented
Moscow with opportunities for spreading socialism with seemingly
very little direct involvement by the Soviet Union. At the
twentieth congress of the CPSU in 1956, Khrushchev announced
that the newly independent states of the Third World along
with the existing socialist states formed "a vast zone of
peace." He asserted that the present disintegration of the
imperialist colonial system is a "development of world
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historical significance" and that the newly independent states
"would play an active part in deciding the destinies of the
entire world." [Ref. 16: p. 18] Khrushchev perceived the
former colonies as natural allies of the Soviet Union eager
to embrace the same socialist ideals. To accelerate the
apparent shift in allegiance from former colonial territories
to individual sovereign states on the path of socialist
development, Khrushchev enunciated the policy of "national
democracy" in 1960, allowing a shortcut to socialism for the
newly independent states. Moreover, in this effort, local
communists were encouraged to cooperate with progressive
national revolutionary movements in a method strongly
reminiscent of Lenin's "united front" formula abandoned by
Stalin thirty years earlier.
In September 1955, using Czechoslovakia as a conduit, the
Soviet Union concluded a major arms agreement with Nasser of
Egypt. This marked the first occasion Moscow ventured the
sale of arms to a non-communist nation. In late 1959, Guinea
became the first sub-Sahara African nation to receive Soviet
military material aid. Ghana and Mali soon followed in this
respect in 1960. Furthermore, Moscow began to supply its
favored factions in national civil wars: the Lumumba faction
in the Congolese civil war and the Algerian rebels in their
struggle for independence against the French. However, he
still urged a cautious approach toward Third World crises
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believing there to be a causal link between local war* and
world war; i.e., he feared that any conflict in the Third
World could escalate and engulf the planet in nuclear world
war. Though Khrushchev announced that war between socialism
and capitalism was no longer inevitable at the 20th Party
Congress, war was still possible and he believed such a war
would not lead to a socialist victory, but to mutual annihi-
lation. After all, Lenin, in prophecying the inevitability
of war between the two opposing social systems, could not have
forseen the advent of nuclear weaponry. Since local wars
would inevitably lead to major wars, local wars should be
avoided. Emphasizing the threat local wars posed, Colonel
General Lomov stated in 1962:
In actuality, such wars (local wars) cannot remain local
for long: They contain a threat for all humanity. A
small imperialist war [one unleashed upon newly independent
countries], as N. S. Khrushchev has noted, regardless of
which of the imperialists started it, can develop into a
world nuclear conflict. [Ref. 17: p. 3]
Ideologically, local war was regarded as an imperialist tool
of coercion and not something socialist countries became
involved in unless it furthered the cause of world peace.
Soviet participation during crises involving the pos-
sibility of a direct U.S. response displayed a characteristic
pattern of circumspection; "combining verbal threats with
*According to the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, local war
is limited by the number of countries involved, usually two
or few, to the territories on which it is fought and by the
weapons used.
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military caution." [Ref. 19: p. 19] During the 1956 Suez
adventure, Khrushchev hinted at launching Soviet rockets
against both France and the United Kingdom if they continued
their aggression against Egypt. However, this instance of
"missile diplomacy" was voiced after the seriousness of the
crisis had dissipated. During the 1958 Lebanese crisis,
Khrushchev's announcement of Soviet maneuvers in the Trans
Transcaucasus and Turkestan military districts in the face of
U.S. and U.K. intervention was the extent of the Soviet
response. Khrushchev's threat of nuclear retaliation on the
U.S. if the latter should attack the Chinese mainland during
the 1958 Quemoy Strait crisis was subsequently discounted by
a Chinese official as empty Soviet blustering [Ref. 19: p. 19]
At the beginning of the Khrushchev era, Soviet military
thinkers continued to classify wars in the same manner
established earlier by Stalin. In addition to classifying
wars as to type, wars were also arranged as to their nature;
either just or unjust. The Socialist states were always just
in their wars against the imperialists and the proletariate
was always considered just in their struggle for independence
against the bourgeoisie in civil wars. Moreover, in wars of
national liberation, the forces fighting for independence
were always viewed as just. Hence, the determination of the
just side in a conflict was made solely on the basis of their
ideological or sociopolitical characteristics. Non- ideological
factors such as scale of warfare or type of weapons employed
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were not considered determinants on the categorization of
conflict. [Ref. 16: p. 31]
In 1960, Khrushchev repudiated the traditional classi-
fication of war and substituted three categories of his own:
world wars, local wars, and wars of national liberation.
Furthermore, Khrushchev for the first time incorporated non-
ideological factors in determining the nature of war.
According to Khrushchev, world wars were unjust because they
threatened to destroy socialism. Moreover, local wars were
also considered unjust because they could very likely escalate
to world war. Only wars of national liberation could be
considered as just and thus encouraged and supported. [Ref.
17: p. 23] Thus in Khrushchev's classification system, non-
ideological factors, scale of war and type of weapons employed
were considered more crucial in determining the nature of
warfare than purely ideological or sociopolitical factors.
However, the implication that local wars were unjust did
not prevent the Politburo from supplying military material to
favored clients involved in "small wars." From 1958 to 1965,
the Soviet Union supplied Indonesia with more than $1 billion
worth of arms to support Sukarno's efforts in three conflicts.
[Ref. 16: p. 19]*
It appears evident that Khrushchev's main purpose in
arranging the new classification scheme was to prevent a major
*The Three conflicts included: the Sumatran rebellion




war from occurring between the U.S. and the USSR and to deter
direct American involvement in Third World conflicts. Since
Moscow lacked symmetrical U.S. power projection capabilities,
Khrushchev's heralding of the dangers of local war seemed the
only available tactic to use. However, increased U.S.
involvement in Indochina during the 1960 's exposed the
futility of this machination.
For most of Khrushchev's tenure, socialism appeared to be
making impressive gains in the Third World without significant
direct Soviet involvement. When delegates from Guinea, Ghana
and Mali attended the twenty-second Congress of the CPSU in
1961, Soviet optimism was high that these former colonial
countries would adopt the "socialist path." Additionally,
New Third World leaders in Egypt, Algeria, Borneo, Morrocco
and Indonesia, though not ardent Marxists, embraced socialist
ideals and were favored by Moscow for their leftist, anti-
Western outlook; labeled by the Kremlin as possessing "genuine
revolutionary potential." [Ref. 19: p. 21] Thus, no esca-
lation of Soviet involvement in Third World conflicts was
warranted. The Khrushchev era was one of optimism relative
to the enhancement of socialist, as well as Soviet, influence
over the former colonial states of the Third World. Soviet
foreign policy was rewarded with substantial geopolitical
achievements in the developing world with little more than
Soviet ideological and moral support. More importantly,
limited Soviet involvement entailed very little risk.
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D. BREZHNEV ERA 1964-1982
During the early Brezhnev years, from 1964-1968, Soviet
foreign policy vis-a-vis the Third World was characterized as
cautious and circumspect. There still remained, quite
ensconced in Soviet political and military thinking the idea
of a causal link between local war and major war; hence
direct Soviet participation in local war was viewed as anathema
to the welfare of the Socialist system. But this juncture
revealed a change in Soviet perceptions of local war and
Soviet involvement in such wars. International affairs,
especially in the post-colonial Third World, appeared more
complex and did not lend themselves to easy Marxist inter-
pretation. After the fall of Khrushchev, the Party and
military restored the traditional classes of war: (1) world
war between opposing social systems; (2) civil wars; (3)
national liberation wars; and (4) wars between imperialist
states. Socio-political factors were once again reasserted
as the primary determinants of nature (just or unjust) of war.
During the mid 1960's, Soviet military thinkers began to
direct their attentions to several new types of warfare, which,
though not unprecedented in the developing world, were never-
theless erupting during this period at a furious pace and did
not fit comfortably in the accepted categories of war. Pre-
viously, Soviet thinkers, both Party and military, considered
national liberation wars as the most prolific type of warfare
taking place in the Third World. However, Third World
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hostilities during this juncture demanded the revamping of the
Soviet definition of warfare in the developing world.
During this period, Soviet thinkers found it necessary to
establish a second type of civil war which differed signi-
ficantly from the traditional Marxist-Leninist definition.
This new type of civil war pitted the people, both pro-
letariate and bourgeoisie, against a "regime of extreme
reaction." [Ref. 17: p. 23] Such struggles were taking place
or had already taken place in Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea,
countries which had previously won independence from the
"colonial yoke." Civil wars of this type were viewed as
unique opportunities for the enhancement of Soviet influence
in the Third World. The U.S., being a conservative power,
would want to uphold the status quo and hence was inclined to
support the regime in power. Consequently, the people against
the regime would seek the Soviet Union to counterbalance
American support creating a potential Soviet ally if the
people won. Thus, in this type of war, the people were always
just and the regime always unjust. This type of struggle did
not necessarily mean that socialism would automatically come
to power, only that conditions for the establishment of
socialism would be enhanced. [Ref. 17: p. 52]
A second type of warfare erupting in the developing world
during this period was war between sovereign, nonaligned Third
World states and was classified as war between "nations of
equal status". The wars in the Middle East and the 1965
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Indo-Pakistani war were included in this category. Further-
more, wars between states of equal status did not have
overriding ideological or sociopolitical origins. Rather,
these conflicts were rooted in traditional state to state
interests and were driven by the politics of the region.
Unlike conflicts between the people and regime of extreme
reaction, the nature of these wars was not easily discerned.
But this dilemma was alleviated when the U.S. became involved;
hence the just side were those forces fighting against those
receiving American support. But even when the U.S. was not
directly supporting one side or the other, imperialism was
still condemned as the agent which created the conditions for
conflict. Moscow's inability to consistently decipher the
just and unjust forces in a Third World conflict involving
states of equal status prevented the Politburo from formulating
a coherent policy towards this type of conflict in general.
Consequently, Moscow decided it should act in whatever way
would further Soviet foreign policy interests, because doing
nothing risked the loss of potential allies in the Third World.
[Ref. 17]
Though Soviet public statements during the early 1960's
advocated increased support for Third World clients engaged
in local wars, it was clear that the degree of Soviet military
involvement should remain limited. The threat of local wars
escalating to world wars remained deeply imbedded in the
Soviet psyche and governed the manner Moscow approached
international affairs. In a speech to the twenty-second
Congress of the CPSU in 1961 Minister of Defense Marshal
Malinovsky cautioned:
The fact is that in contemporary circumstances, any armed
conflict inevitably will escalate into general nuclear
rocket war if the nuclear powers are involved in it.
Thus, we must prepare our armed forces, the country and
all the people for struggle with the aggressor, first
of all and mainly, in conditions of nuclear war. [Ref. 14:
p. 45]
Active Soviet involvement in local conflict was relatively
new and during the early 1960's caution remained the watch-
word of Soviet policy toward Third World conflict. But a
totally passive role for Moscow was out of the question for
such a policy implied relatively uninhibited Western movement
However, during the latter 1960's a shift in Soviet policy
towards the Third World was noted. Beginning in this period
there was a greater emphasis on the use of limited force to
promote Soviet objectives in the developing world. [Ref. 19:
p. 34]*
This apparent shift to a more active role was put to
practice in a number of Third World crises occurring in the
latter 1960's and early 1970's. Soviet military intervention
*Thomas Wolfe cites as evidence of this shift certain doc-
trinal signals; for example the 1968 edition of Sokolovsky's
Military Strategy was revised from earlier editions to include
the statement: "The USSR will, when necessary, also render
military support to peoples subjected to imperialist aggression."
Further evidence in this doctrinal shift was provided by
Brezhnev in his address to the twenty-third CPSU congress in
1966 when he asserted that the USSR would "extend all possible
support" to the national -1 iberation movement, including "poli-
tical, economic, and where necessary, military support."
[Ref. 19: p. 34]
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on the side of the Republican regime during the Yemeni civil
war was the first instance of Soviet power rescuing a non-
communist regime from probable defeat. Additionally, the
Yemeni case provided the first example of Soviet fighter
pilots in combat in the Third World. [Ref. 16: p. 24] The
dispatch of Soviet air defense personnel and fighter pilots
to Egypt in March 1970 to shore up the sieve-like Egyptian
air defense network against the Israeli practice of deep
penetration air strikes during the "war of attrition" pro-
vided another example of the Politburo's increased acceptance
of a more active military role in distant crises.* Moreover,
the Soviet Union became a direct participant in the Dhofar
liberation campaign when the Red Navy transported by sea a
small number of PDAY troops from Aden to the Dhofar region of
Oman.
The early half of the 1970 's presented Moscow with
several opportunities to enhance its influence in the Third
World. The United States failure in Vietnam, represented a
major victory for socialism. Marxist oriented governments
were established in former Portuguese colonies of Guinea-Bissau,
Mozambique and Angola. More importantly, the military cor-
relation of forces had also shifted in favor of the Politburo
and by the early to mid 1970' s the Soviets had reached rough
*The Soviet controlled air defense network in Egypt during
this period effectively served to deter further Israeli strikes
and helped set the stage for the August 1970 ceasefire along
the Suez Canal. [Ref. 19: p. 47]
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strategic nuclear parity with the United States. SALT I had
codified Soviet numerical superiority in both ICBMs and SLBMs
and represented a commitment by each bloc to prevent world
war. Furthermore, the Soviet Union commenced operational
deployment of its third generation ICBMs incorporating MIRV
technology for the first time, and the deployment of the
Delta SSBN in 1973 enabled the General Staff to operate its
strategic retaliatory forces in relatively protected waters
close to the Soviet Union. Additionally, the Soviet Union
had made both significant quantitative and qualitative
improvements to their conventional forces as well. Conse-
quently in the Soviet view, the threat of major war with the
United States had diminished. This favorable shift in the
correlation of forces demanded of the Soviet Union a more
active role in Third World events.
During the early 1970's the Soviet view of the relationship
of local war and world war underwent a significant change.
[Ref. 17: p. 66] In 1971, the Nauka publishing house of the
Soviet Academy of Sciences issued a book written by Major
General A. A. Strokov entitled V. I. Lenin on War and Military
Art. In his book Stokov states that "world war might break
out by growing out of a local conflict - a local war." [Ref.
14: p. 55] The use of the word "might" in describing the
eventuality of major war erupting out of a local conflict
was a definite change from the soothsayers like Malinovsky a
decade earlier who had warned that any war will inevitably
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lead to major nuclear war. This statement by Strokov seems
to imply that since local wars may not inevitably escalate
to nuclear conflagration, the Soviet Union may be acting
irrationally in its attempt to avoid greater involvement in
local struggles; thus forfeiting lucrative opportunities to
enhance the success of Soviet political objectives. While
admitting the possibility that local war still could escalate
to major war, V. M. Kulish, a recognized military strategist,
believed that this would not necessarily nor inevitably occur:
Inasmuch as world war can arise as the consequence of
extremely aggravated economic, political, social, and
other basic contradictions between international systems
and the leading powers of these systems, in it can be
used the most effective weapons of armed struggle, up
to nuclear missiles. However, since a world war can be
simultaneously a nuclear missile one, and consequently,
extremely dangerous for humanity, the probability of its
unleashing is limited. [Ref. 17: p. 67]
Thus according to Kulish, the massive destructive capability
of nuclear weapons may well act to deter their use in conflict
Colonel General Malinovskiy, who earlier spoke of a definite
causal link between local war and world war, stated in 1974
the forces of socialism were now strong enough to prevent
local wars from escalating to major wars. [Ref. 17: p. 68]
Furthermore, General of the Army I. Shavrov, Commandant of
the General Staff Academy, echoed a similar thought:
In terms of scope and weapons employed, a local war is
a local, small war. In comparison to world war, it can
be limited by the number of participant countries and
the limits of a defined geographic region of military
actions and, as a rule, is waged with conventional
weapons. [Ref. 17: p. 69]
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From comments such as these, a general shift can be detected
in Soviet perceptions of the link between local war and major
war. Soviet thinking increasingly emphasized the probability
that local wars escalating to major wars had iminished. No
longer was Moscow faced with the choice of either cowering
in the face of Western involvement and thus risking Western
gains, or risking world war if the Politburo elected to oppose
the West in Third World conflicts. No longer was local war
only considered a tool of imperialist expansion. With the
threat of general war diminished in light of a favorable
shift in the correlation of forces, the Soviet Union could
participate more actively in Third World conflict; hence
enhancing the chances of Soviet expansion in the developing
world. Thus, a more active Soviet policy towards the Third
World would be rewarded with further foreign policy gains
without necessarily risking major confrontation with the U.S.
In 1972, a book edited by V.M. Kulish, entitled Military Force
and International Relations, stressed the importance of
developing the capability to project military power:
Greater importance is being attached to Soviet military
presence in various regions throughout the world,
reinforced by an adequate level of strategic mobility
of its armed forces.
In connection with the task of preventing local wars and
also in those cases wherein military support must be
furnished to these nations fighting for freedom and
independence against the forces of international reaction
and imperialist intervention, the Soviet Union may
require obile and well-trained and well -equipped forces....
Expanding the scale of Soviet military presence and military
assistance furnished by other socialist states is being
viewed today as a very important factor in international
relations. [Ref. 14: p. 58]
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Hence, Kulish was not only advocating the more aggressive
use of military force in the developing world, but was
admonishing the Soviet leadership to develop the necessary
forces to implement such a strategy.
The nature and types of war in the Third World also
underwent further revision by the mid 1970' s. General of
the Army Shavrov introduced a systematic classification of
Third World conflicts which included ideological and socio-
political as well as non- ideological factors. In classifying
Third World conflicts, Shavrov defined all conflicts taking
place in the Third World (including wars of national liberation)
as local wars and classified these in terms of three factors:
(1) sociopolitical, (2) scale, and (3) nature of the weapons
and forces employed. [Ref. 17: p. 76] Unlike Khrushchev,
who considered all local wars unjust because they inevitably
escalated to world war, Shavrov considered the concept of
justness to be neutral and made no specific mention that the
Soviet Union should avoid involvement in local wars. [Ref.
17: p. 76] On the contrary, local wars could be entered by
all nations, including socialist states, to promote foreign
policy objectives.
This new definition of the types and nature of Third World
conflict allowed the. Soviets to make judgements about wars
which did not have a clearly definable class basis. This
understanding was a prerequisite to Moscow's formulating a
more active foreign policy which could be utilized in the
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Kremlin's formula of realpolitik in the developing world.
[Ref. 17: p. 77] The inclusion of non- ideological factors
in the classification of wars at a time when the Soviet Union
was militarily strong implied an increased willingness to
become more directly involved in local wars. The scale and
the types of weapons employed in combat, obvious military
shortcomings before, were now viewed as Soviet advantages
and rationale for an increased military role. In 1974,
Minister of Defense Marshal A. A. Grechko, writing in
"Problems of History of the CPSU", a leading Party theoretical
journal, stated:
At the present stage the historic function of the Soviet
Armed Forces is not restricted to their function in
defending our Motherland and the other socialist states.
In its foreign policy activity the Soviet state purposely
opposes the effort of counterrevolution and the policy
of oppression, supports the national liberation struggle,
and resolutely resists imperialists' aggression in what-
ever distant region of the planet it may appear. [Ref. 14:
p. 59]
Emphasizing that the Soviet armed forces were no longer
restricted to simply the defense of the homeland, Grechko
revealed a new thread in Soviet military doctrine; that Soviet
forces may operate anywhere in the world in pursuit of the
Politburo's interests. [Ref. 14: p. 59] By the mid-1970's
the subject of local wars was given increased attention in
Soviet writings. In War and Army , a 1977 book written by the
faculty members of the leading Soviet military academies,
discussed the new "external function" of the Soviet Armed
Forces. The authors of this book asserted that the
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"international obligation of socialist states is to give
support and aid to liberated countries in suppressing the
imperialist export of armed counterrevolution." [Ref. 14:
p. 61] Although Soviet involvement in local wars was still
perceived as dangerous because they still had the capacity
to escalate into world nuclear war, Soviet participation in
them may be necessary to prevent them from spreading. [Ref.
14: p. 60]
Inasmuch as Moscow realized that greater gains could be
accrued through increased direct involvement in Third World
crises, in practice direct Soviet intervention was not seen
as necessary. After all, the Vietnamese prevailed over a
mcuh stronger adversary with relatively little direct Soviet
support. Hence small scale involvement was perceived as
effective in halting large scale imperial military operations
However, the decade of the 1970's was a period of mixed
optimism in terms of Soviet advances in the Third World.
Closely following Hanoi's victory over South Vietnam in
the spring of 1975, the Marxist MPLA came to power in Angola.
In the 1970s, Moscow signed treaties of friendship and co-
operation with Angola, Mozambique, the Peoples Democratic
Republic of Yemen, Afghanistan, Egypt, Somalia and Syria.
However, during this same period, Moscow suffered several
crucial foreign policy setbacks. First, socialist Allende
government in Chile was forcibly replaced by a right-wing
military regime in 1973. Both Egypt and Somalia abrogated
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their treaties of friendship and cooperation with Moscow in
1976 and 1979 respectively, and events elsewhere created Soviet
apprehension about its abilities to manage events in the
Third World. Though the MPLA emerged victorious in the
Angolan civil war, indigenous ant i- government forces remained
a threat to the Marxist regime. Similarly, Vietnam, after
triumphing over imperialism, had yet to subdue anti-Hanoi
forces in Kampuchea and the Marxist Taraki regime in Afghanistan
also faced serious opposition from internal forces.
Moreover, the American isolationist residue left from the
Vietnam experience showed signs of lessening in the face of
anti-U.S. events in Latin America. The dynamism of inter-
national affairs during the 1970 's forced a reassessment of
Soviet political and military policy in the Third World. By
the mid-1970s, it was no longer thought that Soviet Third
World interests could be protected with limited moral,
economic, and weapons support. A more active military role
seemed to be required to regulate Third World situations in
ways favorable to Soviet foreign policy objectives. Further-
more international events of the latter half of the 1970 *s
demonstrated the difficulty confronting new Third World
countries attempting to maintain themselves on the path of
socialist development.
In 1978, still another type of Third World warfare was
introduced into the Soviet lexicon. This new type was termed
a war "involving a nation on the path of socialist development
67
in defense of socialism." [Ref. 17: p. 73] Hence, nations
such as Angola, Ethiopia, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, which had
undergone socialist revolutions and confronted by internal
or external opposition, fit comfortably in this category.
It must be kept in mind these conflicts were not classified
as wars of national liberation because the unjust side was
not one of the imperialist states vying to maintain control
of its errant colony. Instead the unjust side consisted
mostly of indigenous Third World forces. It is also important
to note that even though these wars involved the defense of
socialism, they were not elevated to the level of wars between
opposing social systems. Thus, by not including this type of
war in the more serious category, Moscow emphasized, like
other local wars, wars in defense of socialism could be pre-
vented from escalating to world war. Furthermore, since these
wars were not classified as wars between opposing social
systems, greater Soviet military effort could be expended
without risking escalation. Thus, in light of these new
developments the Soviet military advocated a more active role
for Soviet foreign policy.
The experience of the revolutionary liberation struggle
of the peoples shows that at critical moments solidarity
with a victorious revolution calls not only for moral
support, but also for material assistance, including
under definite circumstances, military assistance.
[Ref. 17: p. 114]
Thus, the protection of Soviet international interests demanded
an increasingly larger role for the Soviet military. The
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classification of this newest type of Third World conflict
and the Brezhnev Doctrine enunciated nearly ten years before




From the above analysis of the evolution of Soviet local
war doctrine it can be ascertained that Moscow's acceptance
of an increased Soviet role in regional crises was a function
of two primary factors: (1) a significant increase in both
Soviet strategic and conventional military capabilities, and
(2) ideological acceptance of a socialist role in local
struggles other than "wars of national liberation". When the
Soviet Union perceived itself weak vis-a-vis its most likely
adversary, it viewed local war as something that should be
avoided. However, as Moscow became militarily stronger and
could roughly match Washington's strategic nuclear strike
capabilities, Moscow perceived in its newfound strength a
deterrent to U.S. willingness to expand the scope of the small
war and hence a key component in Soviet management of Third
World crises. Moreover, in order to pursue its foreign policy
objectives in the developing world more effectively, these
policies had to be ideologically sound. The Politburo's
acceptance that not all causes of war were class based
represented a dramatic shift Soviet military doctrine and
enabled Moscow to interpret nontraditional international
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situations. Consequently, this realization served as the
foundation for a more aggressive Soviet policy in the Third
World.
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IV. SOVIET NAVY INVOLVEMENT IN LOCAL WARS
A. INTRODUCTION
The Soviet navy's role in local wars soon became apparent.
The Soviets discovered that navies have inherent qualities
making them extremely useful in local wars far from their
borders, especially the ability to project power and influence
to distant areas of the world. Increasingly, the Soviets
began to use their navy in local crises to effect solutions
to these crises in their favor. In short, they saw a need
to develop their naval forces to participate more effectively
in the defense of their state interests outside of the
traditional Soviet sphere of influence.
B. RATIONALE FOR NAVAL INVOLVEMENT
The Soviet leadership was well aware of the crucial role
the Red Navy would play in such conflicts. The February 1972
issue of Morskoi Sbornik contained the lead article in a
series of eleven articles by Admiral of the Fleet of the
Soviet Union Sergei G. Gorshkov entitled "Navies in War and
Peace." Gorshkov asserts that naval might is one of the
important factors enabling certain states to become great
powers. Appealing to the maximalist tendencies of certain
Politburo members, Gorshkov stated "history shows that states
which do not have powerful naval forces have not been able to
hold the status of a great power for a long time." [Ref. 22:
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p. 12] Gorshkov, emphasizing his point, used the pardigm of
the great Spanish Armada whose defeat by the British fleet
exposed a Spain which could no longer protect its foreign
possessions; eventually lost them, and never again was
considered a great power, [Ref. 22: p. 14] Furthermore, he
invokes the lessons of the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish war stressing
the Russians inability to consolidate their impressive
victories against Turkey in the face of the British fleet.
The Russians were forced to agree to a settlement without
achieving one of the main goals of the war- -free access to
the Mediterranean. [Ref. 24: p. 10]
Gorshkov argues that the U.S. involvement in local wars
is more serious and sinister than simply squelching national
liberation movements. He regards such U.S. involvement as
an extension of Washington's "flexible response" strategy:
In seizing individual areas of the globe and in inter-
fering in the internal affairs of countries, the
imperialists are striving to gain new advantageous
strategic positions in the world arena which they need
for the struggle with socialism...." [Ref. 24: p. 21]
Hence, not only does U.S. involvement in local wars directly
threaten "newly independent countries," but more importantly,
is part of the "imperialist" strategy designed to roll back
communism and undermine the existence of the Soviet state
itself. For these reasons, protection of state interests may
be just as important as defending the homeland. This appears
to be part of the basis for implementing in the late 1960s
the forward strategy of the Red Navy.
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In the final article of the series, Gorshkov asserts the
mission of the Red Navy is to "...defend state interests on
the seas and oceans, and to defend the country from possible
attacks from the direction of the seas and oceans." [Ref. 24
p. 13] Hence, it appears that he was elevating "protection
of state interests" to the same level as "defense of the
homeland," essentially making them the same. If this be the
case, then the Soviet Navy must be given the material capa-
bilities with which to perform their mission. To do less
risked painful U.S. successes and the dimunition of Soviet
influence. From Gorshkov' s following statements, it would
seem that the Politburo concurs. Heralding a new era of
naval construction, Gorshkov states:
[T]he Communist Party and the government fully appreciated
both the threat to our country arising from the oceans,
and the need to deter the aggressive aspirations of the
enemy through construction of a new ocean-going navy.
[Ref. 24: p. 16]
After analyzing the operations of the United States and her
allies in the Korean and Vietnam wars, Gorshkov remarked:
The role of the fleet in local wars is determined by the
fact that among the other branches of the armed forces
it is best fitted to carry out, on a wide scale, military
actions against countries well away from the territories
of the aggressor. In the last two decades in all military
conflicts where the geographical conditions have allowed,
an active part has been taken by large forces of the
fleet [Ref. 11: p. 235]
Soviets recognize that navies possess certain inherent and
special qualities enabling a country to extend or project its
influence to areas of the world not contiguous to one's
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national borders. In other words, the navy is the only
branch of the armed forces with the necessary reach and
flexibility (as opposed to Soviet air forces) to effect sol-
utions to events favorable to the foreign policy objectives
of Moscow. Navies are not constrained by the baggage apparent
in the operations of the other branches but embody the
mobility and staying power which make them the ideal conveyor
of foreign policy goals to distant areas of the world.
The navy, as an instrument of foreign policy, has
demonstrated that it can be both beneficial and non-belligerent
The Soviet fleet accomplishes a wide spectrum of politico-
military tasks, ranging from port visits by naval subordinated
ships to direct military intervention in order to influence
the outcome of crises in ways beneficial to the Kremlin.
Admiral Gorshkov asserts:
Friendly visits by the Soviet seamen offer the opportunity
of the peoples of countries visited to see for themselves
the creativity of socialist principles in our country,
the genuine parity of the peoples of the Soviet Union
and their cultural level. In our ships they see the
achievement of Soviet science, technology, and industry.
Soviet mariners, from rating to admiral, bring to the
peoples of the other countries the truth about our
socialist country, our Soviet ideology, and culture and
our Soviet way of 1 if e . . . . Of f icial visits and working calls
of our ships to foreign ports make a substantial con-
tribution to the improvement of mutual understanding
between states and peoples and to the enhancement of the
international authority of the Soviet Union. [Ref. 11:
p. 252]
The peacetime Red naval mission is not entirely one of
blissful exchanges of pleasantries. Its utility during
distant international crises is also extremely important.
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Its mere presence in a crisis situation may demonstrate
resolve to carry out national interests and/or support for
one side in the struggle without necessarily committing forces
to armed combat. Hence, it is the application of military
power deriving influence in circumstances barring the
initiation of hostilities. Admiral Gorshkov understood the
significance of this role, adding:
Demonstrative actions ...in many cases have made it
possible to achieve political ends without resorting
to arms struggle, merely by putting on pressure with
one's own potential might and threatening to start
military operations .... [Ref . 11: p. 248]
Furthermore, Admiral Gorshkov explains the reasons the Soviet
navy is better equipped to accomplish this task than other
branches of the armed services:
As is known, in the last few years it has become common
to hold displays of missile weapons, combat aviation
and various military equipment on an international scale,
pursuing ...to surprise potential enemies with the per-
fection of this equipment, exert on them a demoralizing
influence by the power of one's weapons even in peacetime,
instill in them in advance that efforts to combat
aggression are futile. This technique has often been
employed throughout the history of military rivalry.
True, such a propaganda technique far from always reaches
the goals set, primarily because the means of war displayed
impressed the viewer merely as a potential force. The
navy is another matter. Ships appearing directly offshore
represent a real threat of actions. [Ref. 11: p. 247]
During crisis situations, the strike formations of the fleet
can be dispatched to "restive" areas before a diplomatic
settlement has been reached. These forward forces could be
maintained in a high state of readiness. In certain situations,
according to Gorshkov, the timely dispatch of naval forces
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with limited power would be substantially more important
"than large forces which might be deployed in 60-90 days."
[Ref. 11: p. 168] Thus, in peacetime and in circumstances of
local war, the fleet can play an instrumental role in the
pursuance of a nation's political objectives.
C. SOVIET NAVAL INVOLVEMENT IN THIRD WORLD CRISES
Prior to 1967 the Soviet Navy was too weak to confront
Western sea power directly in remote crisis situations.
Although Moscow realized a definite need to project influence
into the Third World, the Kremlin perceived its strength to
do so as inadequate until the mid to late 1960s. Furthermore,
as a precondition to their excursions into the developing
world, the Soviets noted the requirement to develop strong
strategic nuclear forces. Although a large strategic arsenal
and the means to deliver it would not directly be a part of
Soviet Third World strategy, it would be necessarily but not
directly linked. Strategic weapons would help contain the
expansion of local wars, thereby preventing small wars from
escalating into general war and engulfing the world in a
nuclear holocaust.
The navy's role during the infant stages of the Soviet
forward foreign policy since the 1950s was almost exclusively
in the form of port visits and "show the flag" demonstrations.
The first post World War II visit by a Soviet naval subordinated
ship to a port of a developing country was made in 1957.
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[Ref. 25: p. 89] On this occasion, a cruiser and a destroyer
were dispatched from the Baltic Sea en route to the Mediterranean
Sea and were scheduled for visits to a number of European
littoral ports. Instead, the task group was redirected to
Syria and anchored in Tartus during the Syrian-Turkish crisis
in October of that year. During this visit, Vice-Admiral
Kotov, in charge of the visiting ships, expressed Moscow's
readiness to help Syria "safeguard its independence, bolster
its sovereignty, and resist foreign interference." [Ref. 25:
p. 8] This promise was issued at a time when the Soviets
could not match Western firepower, either strategically or
regionally. This was probably more an idle bluster by
Khrushchev than a willingness to intervene militarily.
Foreign port visits did not increase substantially until
the late 1960s. Between 1953 and 1966, the Soviets conducted
only eight diplomatic visits to ports of less developed
countries with the large proportion of these to the
Meditarranean African littoral countries and Syria. [Ref. 25:
p. 89] These visits were non-belligerent and intricately
orchestrated affairs. State officials arrived to formally
greet host country representatives and much effort was expended
toward gift presentation and the exchange of pleasantries.
Such visits were designed as feelers to divine Russian
acceptance by the developing world.
Port visits remained the only method the Soviets had
available at the the time to demonstrate their power influence.
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They did not have the real power to counter U.S. moves.
Moscow was not able to commit naval forces to the Mediterranean
in 1958 in large enough numbers to counter the U.S. inter-
vention into Lebanon. During this Lebanese crisis, Khrushchev
reportedly rebuffed Nasser's pleas for military support by
saying, "....[T]o be frank, the Soviet Union is not ready for
a clash with the West, the result of which would be uncertain."
[Ref. 26: p. 80] The Soviet response to the U.S. landings in
Lebanon was typical of a major power which perceived its own
strength as far weaker than that of its potential adversary's.
Soviet reaction, for the most part, was limited to verbal
denouncements of the United States and widely publicized naval
exercises in the Black Sea prudently far removed from the
immediate crisis area. Hence, the Soviet response was viewed
as meager in the eyes of the Egyptians who were attempting to
subvert the Chamoun government. The Egyptians, after observing
the Soviet show of support in the Syrian crisis the year before,
had expected more. However, for the Kremlin, the indirect
response was the only viable option. An attempt to inhibit
the movements of the U.S.'s Sixth Fleet armada would have
proved fruitless and could have caused the Politburo extreme
embarrassment at a crucial time when the Soviet Union was
trying to establish itself as a major global power in the eyes
of the Third World. Khrushchev was correct in his analysis
of Soviet capabilities to affect the outcome of the Lebanese
crisis in 1958; Moscow was not ready or able to deal the
military card.
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The Lebanese crisis of 1958 occurred at a time when
Soviet military writers believed war, any war, with the West
would inevitably escalate into general nuclear war. Wars of
this type would be conducted with unlimited means and, if
such a war was to occur, the Kremlin perceived itself as
hopelessly outnumbered. The Lebanese crisis did indeed serve
to diminish Soviet credibility in Egypt and any other de-
veloping countries, but it was a price Moscow felt compelled
to pay.
It was not until the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war that the
Soviet Union was able to field a naval force capable of inter-
vening effectively against a worthy opponent. This episode
served as a test of the Russian will to confront the U.S.
directly in an area that heretofore had been considered under
Washington's "spere of influence/' The members of the
Politburo who still doubted the worth of an interventionist
policy needed proof that Soviet military capabilities were
strong enough to effect favorable outcomes to situations not-
withstanding U.S. actions and without risking nuclear war.
This crisis served as a turning point: it marked the first
extensive use of naval power in a military crisis. [Ref. 26:
p. 87] The war offered Moscow its first opportunity to recoup
some of the credibility it had lost in the previous Lebanese
crisis. Unlike its low-keyed involvement in the Lebanese
affair, the Soviet Union fielded a modern and militarily
capable surface squadron in the Mediterranean. According to
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Bruce Watson, when war erupted in June, "the U.S. Sixth Fleet
confronted the greatest fleet assembled by any nation
potentially hostile to the United States since World War II."
[Ref. 026: p. 88]
This war served as a touchstone to the utility of Gorshkov's
"oceangoing" fleet and its abilities to participate in remote
international crises. The occurance of certain events may
have left the Kremlin with the perception that its involvement
narrowed the range of U.S. military and political options.
For instance, scheduled port visits by U.S. ships were not
curtailed during the crisis and a 2,000 man marine contingent
remained in Malta throughout the affair many days from the
area of hostilities. Furthermore, most Sixth Fleet assets
underway remained in the vicinity of Crete and never ventured
closer than three hundred miles from either the Egyptian or
Israeli coasts. [Ref. 26: p. 88] The Soviet Union, on the
other hand, bolstered its naval squadron in the Mediterranean
throughout the conflict and it eventually numbered slightly
more than seventy ships. [Ref. 26: p. 88]
If, in fact, Soviet naval actions did influence U.S.
decision makers not intervene on behalf of Israel during the
crisis, then Gorshkov's arguments for a large "oceangoing"
navy would have certainly gained credence in the Politburo
and may have convinced certain factions of the utility of the
navy as a foreign policy tool. But evidence to support this
contention is inconclusive. After all, the war was extremely
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short and America's client, Israel, was never really threatened
Thus, there was really no genuine requirement for a more active
role by the U.S. Sixth Fleet. The proof needed to convince
the "doubting Thomases" of the Politburo that the Soviet
Union could conduct a potentially dangerous foreign policy in
the Third World under the shadow of U.S. military power was
not sufficiently provided by the June war experience. This
is not to say that the Soviet Union did not benefit. Soviet
involvement demonstrated national resolve to commit military
forces in support of a "friendly" country. This event along
with supporting Egypt against Israel in the wake of the June
war helped restore Soviet credibility in the developing world
lost during the weeks of the Lebanese affair of 1958 and
opened Egyptian facilities to Soviet military personnel. More-
over, the June war altered regional perceptions of the balance
of power in the Middle East. Although Arab countries were
defeated decisively by the preemptive tactics of the Israeli
military, Moscow's willingness to commit military forces to
support the cause against Israel may have convinced the Arab
governments that there was indeed an alternative to U.S. power
in the region; the Soviet Union. The large scale Soviet naval
response in the June war demonstrated that the U.S. was no
longer free to act in remote areas of the world with impunity;
that in future international crisis Washington would have to
weigh more closely the ramifications of its policy decisions
in light of new Soviet power capabilities. The June 1967 war
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served as a prelude to future Soviet operations in the Third
World.
One operation followed the seizure of two Soviet fishing
trawlers off the coast of Ghana in October 1969. During
stalemated negotiations for their release, the Soviet Union
dispatched a small surface action group (SAG) off Ghanian
waters. This movement was widely publicized and the Ghanian
government was undoubtedly aware of its presence. The
trawlers and their crews were quickly released. Although the
presence of the naval units was clearly not the decisive
factor in the release of the two trawlers, the Kremlin
probably thought that the SAG would strengthen its diplomatic
leverage
.
After the assassination of President Abdirashid Ali
Shermarke of Somalia, a coup placed a pro-Soviet regime in
power. During the subsequent period of instability, the
Soviet Navy conducted several visible and widely publicized
official visits to the Somali ports of Berbera and Mogadiscio
[Ref. 25: p. 127] These naval units demonstrated support for
a favored regime faced with internal instability.
In November 1969, the Soviet Union responded to the
Portuguese attempt to oust Guinean President Sekou Toure a
month earlier. A small contingent of Soviet naval combatants
deployed to the area immediately off the coast of Guinea.
This deployment represented an effort to deter further
Portuguese-led attacks against the Toure government or, if
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necessary, to intercept such attacks at sea. [Ref. 25: p.
130] Moreover, this deployment had the additional mission
of bolstering the government against domestic opposition.
On several occasions a Soviet combatant was anchored immedi-
ately opposite the presidential palace to ensure the president's
safety- [Ref. 25: p. 131] The nearly constant presence of
an LST during the patrol reflected the possibility of direct
Soviet troop involvement to protect the regime and/or the
readiness to evacuate Soviet diplomatic personnel quickly
should a crisis develop. With the threat of Portuguese-led
insurrection high, the Soviet naval patrol provided the Soviet
Union political leverage over the Toure regime that it would
not have had otherwise.
The Jordanian crisis of September 1970 and the Indo-
Pakistani war of December 1971 were both important events in
Soviet naval diplomacy. Each crisis and subsequent Soviet
naval response provided evidence that Soviet capabilities to
intervene in areas of the world not adjacent to Soviet borders
were increasing and that the power projection role continued
to receive major emphasis in the Soviet armed forces,
especially the navy. However, neither crisis could be viewed
as a touchstone of Soviet military power to deter U.S. direct
intervention because the patron/client relationship in each
case was obscure. For instance, the United States did not
have a security commitment with either Jordan or Pakistan.
Hence, superpower options were extremely limited and the
question of who deterred whom is difficult to decipher.
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The Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, or Yom Kippur war,
offered an entirely different setting. Here, the patron/
client lines were clearly drawn. Thus, with this as a back-
drop, the results of a U.S. -Soviet confrontation could be
used to determine who won. At noon on October 6, 1973,
elements of the Egyptian army crossed the Suez and engaged
Israeli positions on the East Bank. This spearhead was
followed by a series of surprising Arab victories on the
battlefield during the first several days of the conflict.
Two days prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the Red navy
numbered fifty-two ships including eleven submarines (two
were probably guided missile equipped) , three cruisers (two
guided missile equipped), six destroyers, five frigates, two
mine sweepers, and two amphibious ships. [Ref. 26: p. 103]
By October 10, the Soviets had increased the number of
submarines to sixteen and the surface combatants to twenty-
one, of which many were guided missile equipped. [Ref. 26:
p. 104] During the next two weeks, the Soviets continued to
augment their Mediterranean eskadra with assets from the
Black Sea. On October 24, Soviet ships in the Mediterranean
numbered eighty units. This force included thirty-one
surface combatants and at least sixteen submarines. Many of
these were guided missile equipped, ideal platforms to counter
the two U.S. carrier battle groups in the Mediterranean at
that time.
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Initially, this unprecedented concentration of Soviet
naval power was reflective of Moscow's determination to deter
possible U.S. military support of Israel in the wake of
inaugural Egyptian victories. Though the U.S. Sixth Fleet
posed no threat to Egypt during this phase of the crisis,
further Egyptian successes might have convinced Washington to
intervene to save Israel, its client. However, as the tide
began to turn in favor of the Israelis, Soviet naval power
remained high to support further unilateral military moves,
first to assist the rearming efforts of its clients, Egypt
and Syria, and second, to support possible direct military
intervention by Soviet armed forces.
The initial U.S. response on 6 October was uncharacter-
istically indecisive. It can be inferred from the memoirs of
Admiral Zumwalt, then Chief of Naval Operations, that his
behavior reflected concern for the inadequacy of available
U.S. sea power. [Ref. 27: p. 446] Orders emanating from
Washington were so strict that even ships' latitude and
longitude were precisely delineated. Thus, U.S. Sixth Fleet
ships remained tightly tethered to the White House, dangerously
curtailing freedom of movement and complicating the conduct
of naval operations. [Ref. 27: p. 435] Vice Admiral Murphy
complained to higher authority on several occasions, but to
no avail. He was denied a request by the White House to move
some of his units eastward in order to clearly assess the
tactical situation and to be in better position to evacuate
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Americans from the crisis area if the order was given. [Ref.
27: p. 436] Additionally, Vice Admiral Murphy was denied
permission to redeploy the U.S.S. Roosevelt battle group
eastward in order to complement the Independence battle group
which was on station in the eastern Mediterranean. [Ref. 27:
p. 436] This augmentation appeared prudent and necessary to
ensure the defense of U.S. naval forces. The U.S.S. Kennedy
and her escorts were dispatched from the North Sea to the
Mediterranean but were ordered to hover west of the Strait of
Gibraltar and, thus, not "chopping" to Sixth Fleet. [Ref. 27:
p. 436] It would not be until the early morning hours of the
25th, minutes before world-wide DEFCON 3 was set, that the
Kennedy was ordered into the Mediterranean. [Ref. 27: p. 436]
This was in direct response to Brezhnev's ultimatum to send
Soviet ground troops into the war zone.
Tensions remained high for the next several days. The
Soviet Mediterranean squadron conducted large-scale anti-
carrier warfare (ACW) exercises which lasted until the 1st of
November. [Ref. 27: p. 443] This was a very crucial period
for the U.S. naval units in the eastern Mediterranean because
it was and is difficult to distinguish an ACW exercise from
the real thing. A high state of tension complicates the
problem and sets the stage for misinterpretation which might
lead to a "hot" situation. The Soviet willingness to take
that chance confirms their presence was more than simply
"showing the flag."
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By the 31st of October, the Soviet Mediterranean squadron
consisted of "96 units, including 34 surface combatants and
23 submarines, possessing a first launch capability of 88
SSMs (surface to surface guided missiles), 348 torpedoes, and
46 SAMs (surface to air guided missiles).*' [Ref. 27: p. 447]
These figures for Soviet naval ships in the Mediterranean
were unprecedented and reflected the Kremlin's willingness to
commit National military forces on behalf of a Third World
client. In the words of Bradford Dismukes, the Soviet forces
could have given a "good account of themselves," which was well
understood by the joint chiefs of staff. Admiral Moorer, then
Chairman JCS, commented that under the circumstance which
prevailed immediately after the setting of DEFCON 3, "we would
lose our ass in the eastern Med" [Ref. 27: p. 444 ] . . .
.
[V] ictory
in the Med would have depended on who struck first." [Ref.
26: p. 107] Admiral Zumwalt concurred with Admiral Moorer '
s
assessment adding that the eastern Mediterranean was the worst
place to fight the Soviets. [Ref. 27: p. 444] The Soviet
Union not only enjoyed geographic closeness to the crisis
area, facilitating easy force augmentation, but during and
immediately after the setting of DEFCON 3, clearly commanded
local military superiority. The carrier Roosevelt had yet to
join Independence in the eastern Mediterranean and Kennedy
was just then transiting the Strait of Gibraltar still nearly
four days steaming time from the crisis area and clearly in
no position to support the vulnerable Independence battle
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group. Describing the days immediately following the setting
of the alert, Admiral Zumwalt reflected, "I doubt the major
units of the U.S. navy were ever in a tenser situation since
World War II ended than the sixth fleet in the Mediterranean
was for the week after the alert was declared." [Ref. 27:
447]
The belief that local U.S. military power had indeed been
checked by the Soviet display is supported by Admiral Zumwalt'
s
analysis of the situation:
I myself regret that in the crunch we lacked either the
military strength or the stable leadership ...to have
supported the Israelis instead of forcing to draw back
from the encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army. How-
ever, we had no choice, the Soviets derived great
benefits from the war. [Ref. 27: p. 449]
This statement cannot be discarded as merely idle lamentations
by the former CNO. If not the actual balance of power, then
at least the perception of the balance of power had shifted
dramatically form the status quo and in favor of the Soviet
Union. Moscow's demonstration of power and its apparent
willingness to use it confined the United States to the role
of observer. Although it is probably true that it was in the
U.S.'s best interest not to have the Egyptian Third Army
crushed in the final days of the Yom Kippur War, it may have
been perceived by the international community that the Soviet
Union had indeed forced Washington's hand into constraining
its client. Hence, on this occasion, the determination as to
who forced whom may have convinced some observers to decide
in favor of Moscow.
The Soviet Union garnered tremendous propaganda value
for their efforts in the war. They had proved once again that
they were the self -proclaimed protectors of the Arab peoples
and the Arab cause against the Israelis. Furthermore, there
is substantial evidence to support the contention that the
Soviet threat to intervene was more than just an idle gesture.
[Ref. 26: p. iii] The apparent Soviet decision to commit
ground troops to fighting could only have been made if and
only if the Politburo perceived an overwhelming chance for
the success. Therefore, at the time the decision was made,
the Politburo must have discerned its regional (Middle East)
military power as strong enough to negate any intrusion by
the United States in Soviet designs. However, in the Russian
mind, regional power alone would not be enough to ensure
success in "local war" operations. It was necessary for the
Soviet Union to possess a powerful arsenal of strategic
nuclear weaponry which would preclude another Cuban missile
episode of Soviet embarrassment and political prostration
before the United States. Moreover, a strong strategic nuclear
force would prevent the escalation of the Middle East crisis
from a "small war" to a nuclear conflagration engulfing the
superpowers in a third World War that nobody wanted. The Yom
Kippur War occurred at a time when the Soviet Union felt
comfortable with and confident in their strategic nuclear
arsenal. SALT one had become law a year earlier essentially
giving Moscow dejure numerical superiority in strategic
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delivery systems. By 1973, the Soviet Union had fielded more
launchers of ICBMs than the United States, 1600 to 1054.
[Ref. 28: p. 53] Hence the perception of power at least may
have compelled the Kremlin to follow a policy of brinksmanship
in the Middle East in 1973.
In the final analysis, Soviet power, or at least Washington's
perception of Soviet power, had a significant impact on U.S.
decision-making concerning a region of the world far removed
from the Soviet Union and tacitly accepted as lying in the
Western sphere of influence. As a result of the events of
October 1973, the balance of power, or at least the inter-
national community's perception of the balance of power, had
shifted in favor of the Soviet Union. Moscow gained an
appreciation of the benefits which may be accrued to the side
which has the capabilities to project power and influence.
However, Moscow also learned that though military power can
be decisive in effecting an immediate solution to a crisis,
it does not guarantee continued long lasting influence in the
client country after the crisis itself has dissipated. The
Soviet Union emerged from the war with noticeably less in-
fluence over Egyptian affairs than they had enjoyed during
the antebellum. This turn of events certainly brought to
light that military aid, even the commitment of national
forces, must be coupled with equal or greater amounts of
political, ideological, and economic support.
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After Portugal's decolonization of Angola in January 1975,
fighting broke out between three competing factions: the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) , the
National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) , and the
National Union (UNITA). The Soviet client MPLA with large
scale support from Cuba and the Soviet Union quickly assumed
the upper hand in the struggle and continued the offensive
until October when the FNLA and UNITA joined forces and
began to threaten MPLA control of Luanda. The Soviets re-
sponded with a massive rescue mission; injecting massive
amounts of supplies and large numbers of Cuban troops into
the crisis area.
The initial Soviet naval response came in late November
when it became clear that Soviet merchant ships required pro-
tection from anti-MPLA forces including a number of Zairian
naval units. In reaction to this potential threat, an
Alligator LST was dispatched from its patrol areas near
Conakry, Guinea to Angolan waters. Its mission was tofold.
Its first task was to protect Soviet merchant ships unloading
supplies for MPLA and Cuban forces, and second, to be in
position to quickly evacuate Soviet personnel in Luanda if
the situation worsened. A Kotlin DDG was also sortied from
the Mediterranean to south Atlantic waters.
By mid-December the situation had stabilized in favor of
MPLA forces and on December 19 the U.S. Senate voted to
terminate support for anti-MPLA elements However, the Soviets
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were not totally convinced that the Senate vote meant the end
of U.S. involvement in Angola. Understandably, the President
of the United States does not need Congressional approval to
commit military forces in a crisis situation. In early
January 1976, a Kresta II sortied the Gibraltar Strait and
sailed south along the west African coast. Furthermore, a
mod- Sverdlov was ordered to assume a position near the
Gibraltar Strait and was soon joined by a Kresta I and mod-
Kahin from the northern fleet. [Ref. 25: p. 148] Moreover,
a Juliet SSG operated in west African waters for most of the
crisis period. These ship movements were probably made in
reaction to U.S. ship movements. The U.S.S. Saratoga had
recently sortied from Mayport, Florida en route for a
scheduled deployment to the Mediterranean. Moreover, Soviet
naval units in the area were also instrumental in supporting
the airlift of Cuban troops from Havana to Luanda and at one
point provided naval gunfire support for MPLA forces, shelling
FNLA forces near Lobito and Bensquela. [Ref. 26: p. 62] The
Soviet naval operations during the Angolan civil war were
measured and anticipatory. It further demonstrated the
utility of an "oceangoing" navy and reemphasized the advantages
of forward deployed naval units.
The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict represented the first
time the Soviet Union defended a socialist state against the
PRC. During the early part of the crisis, Soviet Pacific
fleet combatants were dispatched in two action groups to
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waters contiguous to the crisis area. Eventually the Soviet
naval force totalled nearly thirty ships and, according to
Watson, provided enough power to safeguard ongoing Soviet
operations. By establishing a strong naval presence before
the outbreak of hostilities, Moscow hoped to deter Chinese
actions against Hanoi. However, once hostilities began,
Moscow moved quickly to support its client and also to pro-
tect its own forces in the area. Throughout the crisis, the
Soviet Union maintained a considerable naval presence, con-
ducted reconnaisance and protected airlift and sealift lines
of communications. Furthermore, Soviet naval units visited
Vietnamese ports of Cam Panh, Da Nang, and Haiphong, ostensibly
to deter Chinese air strikes on these ports.
D. CONCLUSION
Soviet capabilities to project power into the Third
World increased substantially during the decade of the 70s.
It was also at this juncture that the concept of local war as
it relates to Soviet military doctrine was put into practice
and matured. Crises in the Third World resulting in Soviet-
American confrontation did not lead to general war as opponents
of aggressive foreign policy had warned. Furthermore, the
apparent success of Soviet military power in narrowing the
range of options available to Washington during the Yom Kippur
War may have convinced Moscow it could participate in Third
World crises, at least militarily, on the same level as the
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United States. In other words, Moscow perceived it could
influence the outcomes of remote international crises not-
withstanding U.S. participation.
In each crisis examined above, the Soviet Union utilized
its naval forces not only to project influence and power,
but also to demonstrate national resolve to support its client
and an apparent willingness to commit armed force if deter-
mined necessary. This is not to say that the primary
objective of the Politburo in each of these cases was the
employment of actual military force; it clearly was not. The
Soviet naval forces had an explicit political mission. How-
ever, the presence of military forces displaying the capa-
bilities to intervene may have affected the perceptions of
Soviet clinets, instilling in them a false sense of security
and a greater inclination to confront opposing forces.
Furthermore, the demonstration of Soviet firepower in a crisis
situation may also affect the perceived freedom of action of
the opposition's patron. For instance, it is quite plausible
to imagine the Politburo departed from the Yom Kippur War with
the perception that it had indeed limited Washington's scope
of action.
Soviet naval participation in Third World crises represents
a realization in Moscow that, in order to protect state
interests in this area of the world, a more active and direct
politico-military policy is required. Socialist gains had to
be protected and the navy, as Gorshkov has stated, was and
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remains the best equipped to accomplish this mission in
remote regions.
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V. SOVIET AIR-CAPABLE SHIPS
In the 1970s we witnessed the beginnings of Soviet dis-
cussions about the development of a new type of aircraft
carrier. This ship represented a significant departure from
previous classes of Soviet carriers. Its potential for use
in local wars suggests that its development was probably
linked to the changes in Soviet thinking on local war out-
lined in a previous chapter. This chapter seeks to briefly
detail the operational/technical differences between the
capabilities of previous carriers and the Kremlin's latest
offering. Additionally, the following chapter seeks to pro-
vide a more detailed analysis of the doctrinal changes that
led to Soviet perceptions of the need for a carrier with such
capabilities .
The Moskva was laid down at Nikolayev South shipyard on
the Black Sea in 1963, suggesting that the decision to build
this ship occurred during the late 1950s or immediately at
the turn of the decade. It was launched in 1965 and com-
missioned in March 1967. Its sister ship, Leningrad
,
was laid
down in 1965 and commissioned in 1968. As mentioned above,
this line of ships was terminated after the construction of
two units, ten short of a programmed twelve. This was
probably in reaction to advances in U.S. submarine launched
ballistic missiles requiring these ships, not exhibiting the
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most stable ship design techniques, to conduct operations
farther away from Soviet bases. Consequently, the Kiev was
designed and built to meet these new Western threats. The
lead unit of this series, Kiev
,
was laid down at the Black
Sea shipyard at Nikolayev in September 1970 suggesting that
the decision to build probably occurred during the mid-1960s.
She was launched in December 1972 and, after nearly 2\ years
of fitting out and sea trials, was commissioned in 1975.
Four units of the Kiev class have been built with the latest,
Kharkov
,
still at the latter stages of its precommissioning
.
The Kiev represents the first line of Soviet ships capable
of operating and supporting a complement of fixed-wing jet
aircraft at sea. It displaces roughtly 43,000 tons making it
2\ times the size of its predecessor, Moskva . It operates a
mix of Yak-36 Forger VTOL aircraft and Ka-25 helicopters. It
was originally classified by the Soviets as a Protivolodochny
Kreyser (anti-submarine cruiser) but in 1978 received a new
designation of taktychesky avionosny kreyser (tactical air-
craft carrying cruiser) suggesting Moscow appreciates its
mission flexibility. Kiev represents Moscow's first attempt
to provide its fleet with sea-based aircraft capable of pro-
viding a viable air defense for its naval forces at sea; thus
allowing the conduct of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in
hostile areas. Though it has taken part in a number of
amphibious exercises demonstrating limited power projection
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capabilities*, according to Western naval analysts, its
primary purpose remains ASW.
Both the Moskva and Kiev could be described as naval
hybrids, incorporating design features of both cruisers and
aircraft carriers. Though both exhibit the capabilities to
perform multiple missions, their primary task appears to be
ASW. Soviet VTOL aviation could not match the range and
payload capabilities of conventional aircraft required to
extend the range of its defensive zone during distant naval
operations and to launch meaningful strikes on targets ashore.
As mentioned above, the Soviets appeared to take steps
designed to enhance its naval power projection role in the
form of their own CTOL aircraft carrier in the early to
mid 1970s.
The keel of the Soviet's first legitimate attack carrier
was laid down in late 1982 at the same Black Sea shipyard
that constructed the first two classes of air-capable ships,
Nikolayev South. [Ref. 20: p. 77] According to Norman Polmar
the facilities at this shipyard were expanded shortly fol-
lowing the keel laying of Kiev unit four in December 1978.
The March 1981 issue of Naval Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Register, states that the Soviet Union purchased
*According to naval analyst John Jordan, this mission is
obviously subsidiary to its primary role of ASW. Jordan
suggests that Kiev's participation in such events was to test
the viability of future concepts and hardware which may be
related to the new CTOL aircraft carrier.
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two massive gantry cranes from Finland to be used in ship
construction. These cranes were delivered in June 1979 and
March 1980 respectively and both were subsequently installed
at Nikolayev South shipyard. Each crane has a separate
lifting capacity of 900 tons and a combined lift capacity of
1500 tons.* This enhances Soviet abilities to construct
large ships such as aircraft carriers. Moreover, the September
24, 1979 edition of Aviation Week and Space Technology noted
that U.S. reconnaisance satellite photos revealed that the
Soviets were conducting catapult and arresting gear tests at
an unspecified airfield. The above evidence suggests that
the formal decision to build their first legitimate aircraft
carrier occurred in the early to mid 1970s and thus framed in
the events and doctrine of that period.
The carrier, being built in two sections, will have a
full-length flight deck with steam catapults and arresting
gear accommodating CTOL aircraft. Possible candidates for its
airwing include models of the Mig 27, SU 27, and the SU 25.
According to Rear Admiral John L. Butts, Director Naval
Intelligence, the ship will displace between 65-75,000 tons,
accommodate 60 tactical aircraft and will probably be nuclear
powered. Moreover, according to this source, sea trials for
the new carrier could begin as early as 1988. However, due to
*Comparable U.S. cranes utilized in the construction of




the Soviet navy's relative unfamiliar ity with carrier and
airwing operations, full operational capability is not
expected before 1992. [Ref. 21: p. 348]
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VI. SOVIET THOUGHT ON AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN LOCAL WARS
A. INTRODUCTION
Following the evolution in Soviet naval doctrine and
their desire to involve themselves in regional conflicts, the
USSR recognized the aircraft carrier's role in local wars.
This chapter traces the general shift in Soviet attitudes
toward aircraft carriers. The Soviets emphasized the aircraft
carrier's utility in power projection in local war operations
and also underlined their need to provide air support to
naval operations. There was a renewed emphasis on sea control
in the Soviet Union that extended to a desire for power over
both the air and underwater realms. Carriers were the only
means of providing air support to naval operations in remote
areas of the world and Soviets recognized their viability in
conventional warfare even while realizing these warships
remain vulnerable in nuclear warfare.
Beginning in the latter years of the 1960's and continuing
through the early 1970's Western analysts discerned a dis-
continuation of the derogatory remarks Soviets made about
attack aircraft carriers which appeared to signal the Defense
Committee's desire to construct them. Beginning at this
juncture, a more favorable appraisal of the utility of aircraft
carriers in general and attack carriers in particular was
openly apparent. During this period, although still pointing
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out certain weaknesses of strike carriers, the articles for
the first time identified certain advantages of aircraft
carriers as well. This chapter details a number of Soviet
authored articles pertaining to aircraft carriers published
during the first half of the 1970s and includes this writer's
analysis of these writings in an attempt to ascertain the
Kremlin's views of the utility of aircraft carriers in local
wars
.
The theme of a large portion of Soviet military writings
is never easily discerned and often ambiguous. Attempts to
decipher statements out of context are exercises in futility
and will often lead to error. It is the overall tone of the
article which is important. The tone, either favorable or
unfavorable, is the best guide to understanding the author's
main premise and whether he is simply stating a fact or
advocating a certain position.
Soviet writers use abstract terms and sometimes write
about the past or the future as if they were happening now.
They often use surrogates to state a position which they may
agree with but which has not received widespread support among
the politico-military bureaucracy. Soviet military writers
rarely state their position unambiguously on an issue which
may be perceived as controversial.
The writings of Admiral of the Fleet Gorshkov are the most
important of the Soviet Naval writers. A member of the Central
Committee and the Defense Committee, Admiral Gorshkov' s words
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are not taken lightly and often reflect subtle shifts in
Soviet naval development and doctrine. Though every Gorshkov
statement does not necessarily reflect a wide concensus among
the "nomenklatura," it does suggest that he has solid support
among the decisionmakers for his stance. A number of Western
analysts believe that Gorshkov will often use a subordinate
to initiate the debate on a certain controversial subject.
Vice Admiral K. Stalbo, Doctor of Naval Sciences, may provide
this role of "ghost writer" on occasion.
B. SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
Admiral K.A. Stalbo's contribution to a 1969 book entitled
History of Naval Art asserts:
Combat actions in the naval theatres in the Second World
War demonstrated that the large-gunned surface combatants
had ceded their leading role to aircraft carriers....
The advent of aircraft carrier aviation made possible the
projection of the air threat to virtually all regions of
the World Ocean. At the same time groups of surface ships
that were provided air cover by carrier fighter airplanes
gained the capability for operating in the zone off the
enemy's shores within the range of his land-based aviation.
[Ref. 29: p. 522]
Explicit in Admiral Stalbo's remarks is the aircraft carrier's
inherent capability to project power into distant reaches of
the globe. Conducting naval operations close to a belligerent's
shores can entail operating far from friendly bases. This
had long been held by naval analysts as a risky task without
local air support. The attack aircraft carrier mitigated the
risk somewhat. Stalbo continues his praise of aircraft
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carriers later in his chapter, lauding the high mobility and
mission flexibility of these ships:
The great mobility of strike carrier task forces, their
thorough electronic countermeasures , and their freedom
to choose the direction of movement, in the opinion of
the Americans, made difficult the search for them in
the oceans, and the delivery against them of air and
submarine strikes. For changing its front of attack,
the strike carrier task force could move 600 miles in
24 hours. Strike carriers represented a considerable
threat and warfare against them was a major and difficult
mission. [Ref. 29: p. 536]
Although using the American surrogate once again, Stalbo
appears to be admitting that due to their inherent qualities
of survival, aircraft carriers may not be as vulnerable as
previously assumed. After stating his case in apparent
support of the strike aircraft carrier, he catalogues the
shortcomings of such ships. He comments that aircraft carriers
remain extremely vulnerable to "detonations of nuclear bombs
and missiles." [Ref. 29: p. 536] He emphasizes the operations
of carrier-based aircraft are very much a function of hospitable
weather conditions, asserting that "...when the seas were
rough, the takeoff and landing of planes were made difficult;
or were excluded." [Ref. 29: p. 536] Moreover, Stalbo
concludes that:
It was not essential to destroy a strike carrier to break
up his attack. It was enough to damage the flight deck
to cause a small list or loss of fore and aft trim.
[Ref. 29: p. 536]
Though detailing the deficiencies of aircraft carriers, Stalbo
did not launch into the winded diatribe announcing the
inevitable capitulation of the carrier which was characteristic
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of many writings before. Stalbo makes clear that these ships
remained vulnerable to modern defenders armed with nuclear
weapons, but to potential belligerents less equipped, the
aircraft carrier could be a viable force. Hence, still
somewhat vulnerable, aircraft carriers permitted wartime
operations which, in their absence, would be extremely
problematic. According to Stalbo:
The lack of aircraft carriers in our Navy limited the
possibilities of the employment of surface ships during
the war. They could operate only in relatively narrow
coastal sectors of the sea in which they could be given
air cover by fighter aircraft from airfields ashore.
[Ref. 29: p. 562]
Hence, Stalbo seemingly laments the absence of attack carriers
in the Soviet Navy. Without such ships, the Red Army would
remain prisoner to the Russian littoral in wartime, ensconced
in its defensive and. support roles.
A May 1970 Red Star article noted the multipurpose
aspects of aircraft carriers:
....it is stated that the extensive and flexible capa-
bilities of aircraft carriers enable them to be employed
for carrying out the most diverse and strategic and
tactical mission. [Ref. 30]
Indicative of an apparent carrier debate prevailing in the
Defense Ministry during this time were comments by Chief of
the Main Staff of the Navy, Admiral N.D. Sergeyev, in an
April 1970 Morskoi Sbornik article entitled "V. I. Lenin on
the Mission of the Navy." Though Sergeyev devotes much of
the article to praising Lenin's early efforts to revive the
Soviet Navy, he provides some oblique insight into the minds
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of many of those who advocated aircraft carrier construction.
In the course of lauding the Party-accepted naval superweapon,
the submarine, Sergeyev states, "[N]uclear submarines con-
stitute the main attack force of the Navy at present . " [Ref.
31: p. 9] (emphasis added) Hence, Sergeyev may be implying
that the submarine, as it has been for many years, is the
accepted superior weapon of modern navies today; however; it
may soon be replaced. Though he does not mention aircraft
carriers per se, Sergeyev does write favorably about the
capabilities of American mobile armed forces; of which attack
aircfraft carriers are an integral part. It could be that he
had the aircraft carrier in mind as a viable replacement for
the submarine.
A June 1970 article in the Soviet naval journal Morskoi
Sbornik entitled "Aviation in Warfare Against the Strike
Forces of a Navy" advocates the construction of aircraft
carriers including the following comments on the need for
such naval forces:
Striving to use aviation at great distances from the
coast has brought about the creation of seaplanes.
These planes, however, could not support actions of
surface ships for a long time and could not strike
enemy ships, without entering the zone of their gunfire.
Thus, a need arose for airplanes based directly on ships.
This was the basis of the beginning of the development
of carrier aviation. [Ref. 32: p. 33]
Moreover, although the author repeats the long voiced con-
tention that large surface ships are vulnerable to submarines
and air strikes, he does devote special attention to the
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defensive means which have been developed to protect those
high value surface units, including surface to air missiles
and guns "deeply echeloned [in an] antiaircraft system,"
[Ref. 32: p. 34] integrated into a very sophisticated system
of electronic countermeasures . Hence, although aircraft
carriers were essentially imbued with certain vulnerabilities
to modern weapons, active and passive protective means could
be implemented to mitigate this deficiency. Seemingly, the
author was advising the General Staff to provide the Navy
with the means with which to successfully implement forward
missions which displaced forces far from friendly bases.
In the September 1970 issue of Morskoi Sbornik
,
Captain
1st Rank V.N. Shevtsov asserted that since their withdrawal
from the first echelon of strategic nuclear forces in the
early 1960's, the primary mission of aircraft carriers was
that of operations in local wars. Shevtsov, in an article
entitled "Present State of and Trend in Development of the
U.S. Navy" claims:
Strike aircraft carriers, although taken out of the
strategic strike forces not too long ago, are now
viewed as on their reserve. They are an important type
of ship for use in local wars and in a nuclear war, as
well as the main means for the conduct of the notorious
politics of force. [Ref. 33: p. 30]
He notes that the U.S. ballistic missile submarine is the
only naval weapon system recognized as part of the strategic
forces; all others, including the aircraft carriers, make up
the general purpose forces. [Ref. 33: p. 27] Though this
107
was not the first occasion in which aircraft carriers were
identified with a local war mission, this aspect of carrier
operations was emphasized thoughout this period. Shevtsov'
s
assertion that the aircraft carrier could be used effectively
in both local as well as major wars, seems to satisfy the
requirements of which Gorshkov spoke in his 1967 article
advocating the construction of a balanced navy.*
The aircraft carrier had indeed been relegated to the
nuclear reserve forces, but Shevtsov cautioned their use in
major wars should not be overlooked:
It is not an accident that the U.S. naval command particu-
larly emphasizes the fact that "the significance of
attack carriers as strategic reserve force in event of
general war in the near future has obviously not diminished.
[Ref. 33: p. 30]
But Shevtsov was not content on seeing just any kind of air-
craft carrier enter the Red Navy. He appeared to be par
particularly interested in one which was nuclear powered.
In the future, the American command plans to build only
attack carriers with nuclear power plants. Under con-
struction at the present time are the nuclear-powered
aircraft carriers Nimitz (CVAN-68) and the D. Eisenhower
(CVAN-69). CVAN-70 is to be laid down somewhat later.
[Ref. 33: p. 31]
Hence, Shevtsov appeared to speculate that if the most advanced
naval power, the one with the most aircraft carrier con-
struction experience, commits itself to the construction of
only nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, should not the Soviet
shipbuilding experts do likewise?
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C. SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN LOCAL
WARS
Aside from a growing Soviet appreciation for aircraft
carriers in general, they began to show specific interest in
carrier utility in local wars. Though expressed previously,
this became evident in a number of articles written during
the early 1970's. Indicative of this was a statement which
appeared in the February 1971 issue of Red Star .
Almost everywhere that imperialism undertakes regular
acts of aggression, the sinister silhouette of an
aircraft carrier appears with its Stars and Stripes.
[Ref. 34]
The author, Captain 1st Rank Petrenko, was drawing attention
to the fact that the aircraft carrier remained the primary
participant in local wars involving the U.S. Furthermore,
Petrenko emphasized another benefit of the aircraft carrier
which heretofore had not often been addressed. He stressed
the carrier's ability to serve as a base in forward areas
when foreign bases were unavailable.
In the July 1971 issue of Military Thought
,
Captain
Second Rank Bestuzhew spoke favorably of aircraft carriers
emphasizing their inherent mobility and flexibility:
Construction of aircraft carriers is continuing. In
contrast to ballistic missile submarines, which are
designed to attack targets on land, the principal offensive
mission if the embarked airwing are:
[1] Attacks of surface units at sea and in port;
[2] Search for and destruction of submarines; and also
[3] Support of ground forces in overseas theaters.
They [aircraft carriers] can move fast and they unprece-
dented freedom of choice of areas for combat employment.
[Strike carriers] in contrast to nuclear-powered
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ballistic-missile submarines, are capable of mounting
attacks with conventional as well as nuclear weapons.
Possessing an extremely high degree of mobility, strike
carriers can cover a thousand kilometers and more in 24
hours. [Ref. 35: p. 6]
Hence, in his subtle defamation of submarines, Bestuzhev
seemed to be advocating the construction of strike aircraft '
carriers, which, unlike ballistic missile submarines that
could only be used in nuclear war, the aircraft carriers could
be used in either conventional or nuclear war. Since a major
war would inevitably involve nuclear weapons, it seems that
Bestezhev may have had in mind local war when referring to
the conventional scenario. Thus, unlike the ballistic missile
carrying submarine, strike aircraft carriers could be used in
local conflicts to project power ashore, utilizing con-
ventional weapons and more importantly, in conflicts less than
world war. It was clear that ballistic missile submarines had
no role whatsoever to play in local war. Hence it would be
unwise to continue to allocate the majority of resources to
the construction of weapon systems which could only accomplish
a narrow range of missions. Even if the Soviet Union elected
to employ nuclear weapons against a foe in a local conflict,
it is doubtful that they would release a portion of their
strategic retaliatory force to take part in such a "small"
war. Furthermore, Bestuzhev' s emphasis on the strike carriers
mobility seemed to imply that these big ships were not as
vulnerable as previously believed.
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The issue of strike carrier participation in local wars
was again put forward in an article appearing in the July
1971 issue of the Army magazine Master Sergeant
,
entitled
"Floating Bandit Airfields." This article, authored by
Captain First Rank Aleksandrov, asserted once again that the
strike carrier was the primary military force used in local
wars :
The purpose of this striking force is no secret: pursuit
of a bandit policy "from a position of strength," pro-
vocations mounted against peace-loving people, and
support of rotten, reactionary regimes. Let us recall
recent events in the Near East and the loathsome role
of aircraft carriers in the war in Indochina. From
three to five carriers are continuously on station off
the coast of Indochina. Aircraft take off from flight
decks of these carriers for bombing missions in Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia. More than 20,000 bandit sorties into
much suffering Indochina have been launched from the
Enterprise alone during its "service" in the Seventh
Fleet."
At the present time, the U.S. Navy has sixteen attack
carriers on the line, not including antisubmarine
carriers. One of these, the Enterprise is nuclear
powered. The naval shipbuilding program calls for three
additional nuclear carriers to be commissioned by 1977.
[Ref. 36: p. 7]
Singling out the achievements of the nuclear carrier Enterprise,
Aleksandrov, like others before him, seemed to be interested
in the construction of nuclear powered carriers for the Soviet
fleet. Moreover, when he asks his readers to recall "recent
events in the Near East," he was stressing the fact that these
ships could be very important even in situations where they
did not engage in hostilities. Aleksandrov makes no secret
of the primary purpose of strike carriers. In his view,
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these ships are used by Washington in support of its
"militaristic" foreign policy vis-a-vis the developing world.
It is apparent from Aleksandrov ' s remarks the strike aircraft
carrier is an extremely vital means of projecting power in
support of client regimes in the Third World.
In another paragraph, Aleksandrov addresses the vulner-
ability issue of aircraft carriers; however, he differentiates
carrier vulnerability in a major war and in a conventional
one
.
Considerable difference of opinion still exists on the
relative vulnerability of aircraft carriers. For example,
the magazine Aeronautics says the following: " ...a single
nuclear warhead of 30 kilotons or so striking less than
500 meters from a carrier of the Forrestal class would
send it to the bottom." As for conventional weapons,
World War II demonstrated that these ships, even after
sustaining considerable damage, not only remained afloat
but continued operating effectively. [Ref. 36: p. 9]
Hence, according to Aleksandrov, strike carriers remain
vulnerable to nuclear weapons; the type of weapons that will
most likely be used in a world war. However, aircraft
carriers are very much survivable in a conventional war or
local war. To stress this fact further he states that the
Forrestal "is divided into more than 1,200 water-tight com-
partments, a fact which undoubtedly makes it very difficult
to sink." [Ref. 36: p. 9] Hence, in a local war scenario,
aircraft carriers are not only very useful, but also extremely
survivable. The carrier's survivability was very much in
question in world war.
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According to Gorshkov, it would be folly to enter into a
potential combat situation with the U.S. lacking symmetrical
capabilities to repel the adversary because every battle
contains the possibility of defeat. [Ref. 2: p. 6]
In "Navies in War and Peace," Gorshkov writes favorably
about aircraft carriers stressing the requirement of
maintaining air superiority in the theater of operations.
He states that military operations in the Great Patriotic War
demonstrated that:
Air superiority in the area of operations became the
indispensible condition for the successful conduct of
it even when the enemy was superior in other forces.
[Ref. 37: p.. 13]
This is indicative of the great respect Gorshkov had for
aviation and the realization of the importance for gaining
command of the air. Hence, even at a quantitative disadvantage
in overall forces, the smaller force might still prevail if
it controlled the airspace over the battle area. Since the
dynamism of international relations did not guarantee timely
access to foreign bases, the only viable means for vying for
air superiority in theaters of operations far from Soviet
borders remained sea-based aviation; hence the attack aircraft
carrier
.
Gorshkov presents an argument for the construction of
specific aircraft for the naval branch of the armed forces.
Analyzing naval aviation in the pre-war years and during the
war he asserts:
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[Naval aviation] did not have special naval aircraft
and therefore was equipped with aircraft designed for
the other branches of the armed forces. While effective
for operations against land targets, they were poorly
suited for carrying out combat missions at sea.
Due to the short operating range, weak armament and
short endurance, naval fighter aviation was not in
condition to reliably cover forces at sea even at
relatively short distances from shore. This considerably
limited the employment of major fleet surface forces in
zones accessible to hostile aircraft. [Ref. 38: p. 6]
From the above statement, it is clear Gorshkov desires
specialized naval aircraft capable of accomplishing missions
in direct support of the fleet. Furthermore, according to
his last statement, it appears that Gorshkov is stressing that
these aircraft be based at sea in order to provide timely
support in the theater of naval operations, which may be in
areas within reach of hostile aircraft but far removed from
friendly bases.
Gorshkov continued his favorable appraisal of aircraft
carriers and provided further evidence that he had aircraft
carriers in mind when calling for the construction of a
balanced fleet. Stating the importance of aircraft carriers
rose during the war and that superiority in surface ships had
completely shifted to these types of ships, Gorshkov gave no
indication, as he had given previously, this superiority had
diminished. Unlike his 1967 Morskoi Sbornik article which
announced the "inevitable demise" of the aircraft carrier,
the "Navies on war and in Peace" series contained no derogatory
remarks about aircraft carriers. This aspect of the series
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could possibly reflect a shift in Soviet decisionmakers'
thinking towards aircraft carriers. Though for many years
Gorshkov's naval subordinates had written about aircraft
carriers, this was the first occasion when a member of the
Central Committee had come out so openly in support of such
ships
.
In a book published in 1972 entitled Aircraft Carriers
and Helicopter Carriers
,
the authors appear to clearly
advocate the construction of attack aircraft carriers for
the Soviet Navy. The authors asserted unequivocally that the
attack aircraft carrier was survivable in limited war:
As concerns the survivability of aircraft carriers, for
the conduct of limited wars with the employment of con-
ventional weapons, the large aircraft carriers have
protective protection and so have greater survivability
than ships of small displacement. [Ref. 39: p. 298]
Hence, in limited wars in which conventional weapons were used,
aircraft carriers were less vulnerable than other classes of
ships. They still remained extremely vulnerable to nuclear
weapons, thus their efficacy in world war would be marginal.
Moroever, the authors are emphatic in their support for
a nuclear powered attack aircraft carrier. While admitting
that the cost of building aircraft carriers was very great,
nuclear powered carriers were said to be more effective than
their conventional counterpart. [Ref. 39: p. 158] Stressing
that the attack aircraft carrier is the sine quo non of a
balanced fleet, the authors stated:
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Strike carriers belong to the general purpose forces
and ...are capable of carrying out many tasks sufficiently
effectively in general war as well as in local wars.
[Ref. 39: p. 295]
An article entitled "U.S. Aircraft Carrier Operations off
the Coast of Vietnam" appeared in the December 1972 issue of
Morskoi Sbornik . Though pointing out several shortcomings of
aircraft carriers, it nevertheless stressed the major role
these combatants were playing in the Indochinese conflict.
The authors were cognizant of the dangers posed by "the huge
stores of aviation fuel, bombs and missiles [that] created a
never ending threat of fire and explosion." [Ref. 40: p. 72]









Independence and Saratoga .
Overall, this accounted for a fairly mild criticism of
the aircraft carrier. Published late in 1972, during the
Paris Peacetalks, the authors may have felt restrained in their
praise of the aircraft carrier so as not to lessen American
frustrations or to increase Hanoi's anxieties.
An article in the August 1973 issue of Morskoi Sbornik by
Engineer-Captain 2nd Rank V. Yeliseyev entitled "Strategic
Forces Reserve," focused on the non-strategic missions of the
U.S. attack carrier fleet. According to the author, the
American attack carrier forces are now the main forces of the
Navy in limited warfare . . .
.
[ Ref . 41: p. 40] Quoting the then
Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs Admiral Moorer, Yeliseyev
writes, "(E)xcluding general nuclear war, the aircraft is the
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main striking force of the Navy for all types of combat
operations." [Ref. 41: p. 40] Yeliseyev also stated that
the advantages of attack carriers forces are their high
mobility and maneuverability. Moreover, he asserts that
aircraft carriers serve as an invaluable alternative to the
"reduced number of (American) overseas naval bases." [Ref.
41: p. 40] The argument stressed by Yeliseyev above con-
cerning the substitute of aircraft carriers for elusive
foreign bases is significant in its timeliness. The Soviet
Union suffered a major drawback in its foreign policy in the
Mediterranean with the mass expulsion of Soviet military
advisors and operational troops from Egypt in July 1972. The
number of Soviet personnel expelled during this period was
put at 15,000. [Ref. 42] The author, in his favorable
portrayal of strike aircraft carriers, espouses the advantages
of nuclear powered carriers over conventionally powered ones.
Nuclear power untethers the ship from its potentially vul-
nerable rear services. Since aircraft carriers are overly
susceptible to attack when replenishing, the fact that nuclear
powered ships do not need to be constantly refueled makes them
more survivable. [Ref. 41: p. 43]
Along the same lines using American naval experts as
surrogates, he states that the "nuclear-powered aircraft
carrier has a combat efficiency coefficient of 1.2 compared
to conventional types of carriers." [Ref. 41: p. 43] Though
initially more expensive to build, nuclear carriers were less
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vulnerable and more efficient than conventionally powered
carriers.
In the July 1974 issue of Morskoi Sbornik an article
very much in favor of aircraft carriers appeared. This
article, entitled "The Present and Future of Attack Aircraft
Carriers," again listed the power projection role as the
primary mission of modern attack aircraft carriers. Though
the attack carrier had been removed from the primary stra-
tegic mission of nuclear strike in U.S. war plans, they still
occupied a valuable place in American strategy:
. The removal of attack aircraft carriers from the first
echelon to the reserve of strategic forces in a general
nuclear war by no means excludes the broad use of
carriers to carry out important missions. The command
of the U.S. Navy names at least three of these important
missions: first, shipboard aircraft remain the chief
component of tactical aviation in a local war; second
aircraft carriers are an integral part of the forces
which provide for "supremacy at sea;" third, aircraft
carrier formations are an irreplaceable tool of "gunboat
diplomacy" which provides for a "military presence"
wherever needed in peacetime. [Ref. 43: p. 56]
The author, R. Tumbovskiy, appeared to be alerting the reader
to the fact that though the aircraft carrier had indeed been
removed from the category of first strike nuclear forces, its
utility had not diminished. To Tumbovskiy, the attack air-
craft carrier represents an invaluable asset in the conduct
of local wars. Quoting then U.S. Chairman of JCS, General
Wheeler, he offers another benefit associated with the aircraft
carrier
:
If the war in Vietnam ends, in order to realize the Nixon
Doctrine which calls for rendering support to all our
allies with a lessening of the involvement of the United
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States in small conflicts, I think it desireable to have
16 attack carriers, based not on a peacetime situation
but on a possible war in the future. [Ref. 43: p. 57]
Thus, according to Tumovskiy, the attack aircraft carrier
could reduce, in certain situations, direct Soviet involvement
in crises which do not necessarily guarantee a large chance
of success. With the addition of strike carriers to the Red
Naval inventory, the Politburo could better direct its actions
in a Third World crisis providing effective support to its
favored clients without becoming deeply and dangerously
entangled in a potentially unrewarding situation. Hence, the
attack aircraft carrier could act as a seagoing surrogate of
Soviet power and influence. It appears that Tumbovskiy was
using the aircraft carrier to allay the fears that certain
Politburo members may have voiced about risk-filled Soviet
involvement in "small wars."
After establishing that the primary role of the attack
aircraft carrier was in local wars, Tumbovskiy set out to
convince the reader that if such a ship should become a part
of the Soviet fleet, it should be nuclear powered. He states
that nuclear powered ships have many tactical advantages over
their conventionally powered counterparts, including endurance
and greater survivability.
The largest ships ever built in the USA will be the carriers
of the Nimitz class. The supply of nuclear fuel should
assure such a ship 13 years of sailing without recharging
the reactors (this is equivalent to the expenditure of
1.32 million tons of oil).
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An ACG (Aircraft Carrier Group) with a nuclear carrier
can carry out combat operations for 12 days without
replenishment (7 days with a conventional carrier)
.
The range of nuclear-powered carrier with a screen of
four frigates with conventional propulsion plants
increase twofold in comparison with the range of an
ACG consisting completely of ships with steam power
plants
.
The capability of nuclear power plants for rapid
operational maneuver will permit delivering airstrikes
over a large area and at a large number of targets;
selecting departure routes for the combat area with
the least probability of detection of the ACG by the
enemy and thereby better providing tactical and
operational surprise; proceeding to their destination
while skirting storm and hurricane belts, which is
very important for carrier forces, which are very
dependent on the weather; spending prolonged periods
in the ocean in constant readiness to transfer to an
assigned area. [Ref. 43: p. 59]
Tumbovskiy's statements concerning reducing the load on
the naval support forces and dependence on bases probably
struck a nerve in the Politburo. At-sea replenishment has
long been considered by Western analysts to be imperative to
a forward operating strategy and something that the Soviet
Navy was not terribly proficient at. Moreover, the lesson
of the Soviet forced withdrawal from Egypt less than two years
earlier could not have been so easily forgotten. Foreign
bases had long been a problem in supporting their fleet in
the forward area.
Tumbovskiy continues with his positive portrayal of
nuclear powered attack carriers and though admitting that
they are very expensive to build, they could be in operation
with the fleet for over "30 years." [Ref. 43: p. 61] Hence,
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they were not systems that needed replacement right away and
if the cost were spread over 30 years, then yearly costs
would certainly not be exhorbitant. This may have been
directed towards the member of the Army-dominated Defense
Council who voiced opposition to the construction of aircraft
carriers on the grounds that they were too expensive and
would drain resources away from other more important weapons
systems
.
An article appearing in the August 1974 issue of Morskoi
Sbornik entitled "Multipurpose Aircraft Carrying Ships"
seemed to advocate the construction of relatively small "sea-
control" ships (SCS) capable of operating VTOL aircraft.
Though the author asserts that the SCS would be much cheaper
to build than attack carriers, the SCS was incapable of
accomplishing all the missions that a strike carrier would.
Stating that current VTOL aircraft could only carry out
defensive missions because of limited "speed and small radius
of operation," the execution of other missions "above all,
offensive missions, will be entrusted to aircraft of attack
•carriers." [Ref. 44: p. 50] Hence, he was admitting that
current VTOL technology was not sufficient to accomplish the
power projection mission.
In October 1975, an article entitled "Some Trends in the
Development of Naval Tactics" was published in the Morskoi
Sbornik . The author, Captain 1st Rank N. V'yunenko, states
that aviation is playing an increasingly important role in
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the evolution of naval tactics. In advocacy for the con-
struction of aircraft carriers, he asserts that:
The joint employment of aircraft carriers with other
surface ships, submarines, and anti-submarine aircraft
makes it possible to create effective mobile zones of
supremacy on the high seas....
Within this space the assumption is to provide absolute
supremacy beneath the water surface, on the sea, and in
the air, that is, to destroy enemy forces before they
are able to attack ships and transports located within
that zone. [Ref. 45: p. 14]
V'yunenko's failure to include submarines in his list of assets
which need protection implies that these mobile zones of
supremacy are not analogous to the SSBN bastion defensive
scheme
.
A later statement stressing that "under today's conditions
the struggle against enemy aircraft has also been extended to
remote regions of the oceans, including those regions which
quite recently were considered out of range for aircraft...."
indicates these zones of supremacy may have to be established
to support Soviet military contingencies in the Third World.
Though speaking favorably of VTOL aircraft, he adamantly
states that the primary mission of VTOL carriers is to provide
air defense for other "air capable" ships and a secondary
mission of operation against surface targets only in the
absence of attack aircraft carriers. [Ref. 45: p. 40] Hence,
if anything, V'yunenko is calling for the construction of
both and not advocating substituting the construction of
less expensive VTOL air-capable ships for more capable attack
aircraft carriers.
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The June 1974 issue of Morskoi Sbornik carried an article
entitled "Carrier Aircraft in Local War." This selection
detailed the American sea-based involvement in the Indochinese
war from 1964-72. Overall, the author, Captain 2nd Rank V.
Katin, dealt a favorable critique of the capabilities of
carrier based attack aircraft in what the author called
"combat conditions of a complex theatre of military operation."
[Ref. 46: p. 72] The article begins by emphasizing the
crucial role aircraft carriers have played in local wars
since 1945:
Without exception in all military conflicts unleashed by
the imperialists since 1945, naval aircraft ...have played
a most important role in combat operations on the ground.
[Ref. 46: p. 60]
Hence, aircraft carriers have been very instrumental in pro-
jecting power ashore, a critical capability of naval forces
are to participate more directly and effectively in the
combat situation ashore.
Moreover, according to Katin, carrier based aircraft were
used, especially during the last few years of the war, to
make up "for the shortage of their own (U.S.) ground forces."
[Ref. 46: p. 60] By this time, the American ground with-
drawal was well underway and TACAIR, including carrier-based
aircraft, was given the responsibility of supporting this
decreased complement. This issue is very important to a
Politburo which is not prone to taking chances especially
when outcomes cannot clearly be foreseen. Carrier based
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aircraft could serve as surrogates of Soviet ground troops
in a crisis in which direct Soviet troop involvement may not
be politically expedient; hence provoking an unwanted response
from the United States. Carrier based strikes in support of
clients are not synonymous in the realm of high geo-politics
with direct troop involvement on the ground. Each event
would not elicit identical responses from the other super-
power. Actual ground troop employment would undoubtedly be
perceived as much more severe than the conduct of air strikes
during the same crisis. Providing remote fire support for
favored Soviet clients would not be unprecedented. The
Soviets have provided this on numerous occasions in past
Third World crises.
Katin writes, almost enviously it seems, about U.S. power
projection capabilities. He laboriously recounts the number
of aircraft used in the total number of bombing sorties con-
ducted during the course of the war.* He further cites as
another advantage of carrier based strike aviation the fact
that they do not require foreign bases to conduct their
operations. [Ref. 43: p. 62] Moreover, he states that
during the early phase of the stepped up American bombing
campaign in Vietnam (1965-1966) when U.S. land operating
*According to Katin's figures, the U.S. conducted more
than 1.5 million combat sorties and expended more than 6.5
million tons of air to ground ordnance. He states that this
was more than triple the total weight of bombs dropped during
World War II.
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bases were few, "the role of the carrier aircraft was a
decisive one." [Ref. 43: p. 62]
This issue of unavailability of foreign operating bases
is a very important one for the Soviet Union. Simply stated,
the aircraft carrier precludes the requirement for friendly
bases which are seen by the Politburo as elusive. Again, as
in so many articles written about aircraft carriers and
carrier aviation during this period (early seventies) , this
selection was totally void of any derogatory remarks directed
at aircraft carriers. It was obvious from Katin's favorable
account of aircraft carriers in the Indochina War that he
was advocating their construction for the Soviet Navy, and
that they are a very important and extremely capable weapons
system in the conduct of local wars.
In February 1976 a book by Admiral of the Fleet of the
Soviet Union, Sergei G. Gorshkov entitled Sea Power of the
State was published by the Military Publishing House in
Moscow. The timing of the publication, just two weeks prior
to the 25th Congress of the CPSU, apparently was intended to
increase its impact within Soviet political society. Sea
Power of the State was printed in 60,000 copies, an unusually
large number for a military work. The size of the printing
indicates that the book was aimed at the influential decision
makers of the Politburo and Central Committee and not just
the Soviet military establishment. [Ref. 47: p. 1] Though
most of what Gorshkov writes is not new, it appears as an
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attempt to justify past and future Soviet program planning
decision concerning the Navy.
In Sea Power of the State, Gorshkov elucidates categories
of naval combat: fleet against fleet and fleet against the
shore, with the latter concept occupying the most important
position in naval warfare. Though Gorshkov clearly states
that the attacks launched from ballistic missile carrying
submarines against "strategically and economically important
land targets" is the most important aspect of fleet against
shore operations, it is clearly not the only component of it.
He concludes very concisely that attacks by carrier aircraft
also play a large part in "fleet against shore" operations.
[Ref. 7: p. 272] Fleet against shore operations have subsumed
the primary mission of naval warfare because unlike "fleet
against fleet" operations, fleet against shore has a direct
"territorial" invasion. "Fleet against fleet" operations
only "created the conditions" for the subsequent accomplishment
of territorial missions. To emphasize that the fleet against
the shore role was not totally the domain of the ballistic
missile carrying submarine, Gorshkov states:
The explosive development of aviation and shipbuilding
in the Second World War brought about the appearance
of a new form of employing naval forces against the
shore, i.e. the delivery of attacks by carrier aircraft
against enemy territory and troops.
It is true that the experience in such operations was
limited to the employment of aircraft carriers by only
three countries, Great Britain, Japan, and the United
States. However, this experience has become convincing
proof of the practicality of employing this form of
operation, which has led to a considerable expansion in
carrier construction. [Ref. 7: p. 281]
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Hence, aircraft carriers also have a major mission of "fleet
against shore" combat operations, in other words, the aircraft
carrier has a recognized power projection mission. Moreover,
carrier operations have provided convincing proof of the
utility of operating carrier-based aircraft in this role, and
hence the need for their construction. Furthermore, Gorshkov
states in a subsequent paragraph that the "experience" of
operating aircraft carriers against the shore has seen
widespread use in local wars:
The experience during the Second World War in employing
carrier aircraft against land objectives has been widely
used by American militarists in local wars, especially
to deliver attacks against troops, cities, bases, airfields
and ground communications .... [Ref. 7: p. 282]
Hence, it may have been the operations of carrier forces
in local wars which provided the actual "convincing proof"
of their "practicality" in conducting attacks ashore. Gorshkov
continues to herald the ever- increasing importance of "fleet
against shore" operations in any future conflict:
In our day, a navy operating against the shore possess
the capability not only of prosecuting missions related
to territorial changes, but also of directly affecting
the course and even the outcome of the war. In this
connection, naval operations against the shore have
assumed dominant importance in naval warfare, and both
the technical policy of building a navy and the
development of the art of naval warfare have been
subordinated to them. [Ref: p. 282]
Since admittedly carrier-based aircraft also have an important
"fleet against the shore" role, Gorshkov could be announcing
the construction of an attack aircraft carrier when he affirms
that both the "technical policy of building a navy and the
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development of the art of naval warfare" have been focused
on the "fleet against the shore" mission.
Later in his book, Gorshkov devotes several pages to the
concept of sea control and the naval imperative of achieving
it during hostilities. According to Gorshkov, sea control
is not a goal in itself, but only "a path to establishing
certain conditions" which permit naval forces to accomplish
subsequent missions within a specific period of time. [Ref.
7: p. 295] The gaining of sea control would enable the
formation of necessary groupings of forces to successfully
carry out assigned combat missions. It is important to note
that the acquisition of sea control in a certain theater of
military operations is important in major wars as well as
local or small wars. Additionally, he claims that no longer
does sea control mean simply the acquisition of dominance on
sea surface. The definition of sea control has been extended
to encompass the "depths of the oceans and to the airspace
above it." [Ref. 7: p. 298] Hence, if air superiority was
in fact one of the prerequisites for gaining control of the
sea, then in theaters of military operations far from Soviet
territorial waters, sea-based aircraft remained the only
viable means with which to provide for this contingency.
Without air superiority the success of subsequent operations
could not be guaranteed. The effectiveness of Western carrier
operations in local wars was not lost on Gorshkov. He states
that the capability of aircraft carriers to deliver attacks
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on targets located at great distances, serves to expand the
area of operations in favor of the attacker. Moreover, on
several occasions, Gorshkov emphatically affirms that the
attach aircraft carrier is the most important weapon system
in local wars. [Ref. 7: p. 300] According to Gorshkov,
"carriers are frequently the sole means permitting the bases
of attack aircraft to be moved closer to the area of combat
operations." [Ref. 7: p. 301]
Stressing that submarines have a very limited role to
play in local wars, Gorshkov states "Aircraft carriers and
their aircraft, and other surface ships have played the main
role among the naval forces participating in local wars."
[Ref. 7: p. 303] Also, noticeably absent from this list of
primary forces in local wars was any mention of land-based
aircraft. In fact, Gorshkov explicitly states that it is
"aircraft carriers and their aircraft" which have fulfilled
the primary role in local conflict. Hence, it would seem
that land-based aircraft have a very limited role in small
wars, probably because of the inavai labi lity of foreign air
bases. Again, Moscow remained sensitive to the geopolitical
importance concomitant with their forced withdrawal from
Egypt in 1972. Thus, aircraft carriers seemd to offer the
only legitimate substitute.
This favorable portragual of carrier based aviation
continues in his discussion of the combat operations during
the Korean and Vietnam wars. Although he refers to the
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amphibious landing at Inchon during the Korean War as a
"Pyrrhic victory" for the Americans, carrier-based aircraft
performed extremely effectively. Gorshkov goes so far as to
suggest that the "interventionists" would have lost the war
if not for the crucial support provided by their forces.
Gorshkov presents some impressive statistics to support his
contention that the trend in the use of aircraft carriers in
local conflicts was indeed increasing. He asserts that more
than 50% of all combat sorties in South Vietnam originated
from the decks of the U.S. aircraft carriers operating in the
Gulf of Tonkin. According to Gorshkov, between 1965 and 1972
carrier aircraft made up to 8,000 aircraft sorties per month,
with a single aircraft carrier flying as many as 178 sorties
per day. [Ref. 7: p. 317] In listing statistics such as
these, Gorshkov appeared impressed, almost envious, of U.S.
attack carrier capabilities.
In the chapter entitled "Problems of Balancing Navies,"
Gorshkov uses the examples of naval unpreparedness to carry
out various missions during the course of World War 11 to
plead his case for a balanced fleet. To Gorshkov, a balanced
fleet is one which maintains "all the elements comprising its
combat strength in the most favorable combination...;"
[Ref. 7: p. 322] hence one which is capable of effectively
participating in any type of war, nuclear or conventional.
Moreover, he asserts that military doctrine determines the
role of the military and the types of forces comprising it.
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From this, it is military doctrine which presupposes the
the types and mix of forces required to achieve politico-
military objectives. Hence, any shift in the military
doctrine may also foretell changes in force structure and
signal new weapons development. Furthermore, Gorshkov
states that the "manner of balancing a navy is not fixed;
under certain historical conditions it can change." [Ref.
7: p. 324] Among the factors affecting the determinants of
a balanced navy, its mission is of primary importance. Using
examples of combat failures during the two world wars, Gorshkov
appears to be exhorting higher authority to provide the
necessary means with which to carry out successfully new and
more difficult operations. For instance his criticism of the
British Admiralty in its planning and execution of the
amphibious landing at Gallipoli during World War 1 is a
notorious example of a navy ill-prepared to accomplish its
assigned mission. Simply, the British lacked special landing
ships with which to attempt such a feat and this contributed
decisively to the failure of the mission.
Similarly, Gorshkov criticizes the German high command
for fielding a navy based "primarily on one arm, the submarine
force," which constrained the range of missions of the German
Navy through the course of World War II. [Ref. 7: p. 336]
Hence, he was asserting that a navy designed to accomplish
only a narrow set of missions will be predisposed to the
fulfillment of only those and will be hardpressed to prevail
in its quest of new tasks. In other words, unless given the
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proper tools of warfare, the Soviet military could also suffer
a similar fate in its attempt to carry out new assignments
associated with a new military doctrine. The only thing
Soviets lack in their quest for a balanced fleet is assured
air support for distant operations which can only be provided
by aircraft carriers in areas not adjacent to Soviet borders.
Soviets learned in Egypt in 1972 that they cannot depend on
the use of foreign bases and must have ships from which to
launch attacks and defend their forces.
Strike aircraft carrier advocates remained extremely
vocal through the 1970s and the pro-carrier rhetoric
espoused during the early part of the decade extended into
the 1980s. In assessing the Japanese aircraft carrier
operations against the British Fleet during World War 11
Indian Ocean operations, Captain 1st Rank G. Gel' fond
asserted that although the Japanese Imperial Navy was inferior
to the British Navy in all types of ships except aircraft
carriers, the Japanese dominated the early years of the war.
[Ref. 48: p. 18] Gel' fond concluded that this "superiority
in aircraft carriers to no small degree, favored the
achievement of success by the Japanese." He also ascertained
from his analysis of Anglo- Japanese wartime operations that
the aircraft was a formidable force in areas remote from
friendly bases. [Ref. 48: p. 19]
Later the same year, Admiral Stalbo contributed an
extremely favorable opinion of aircraft carriers in local
wars in an article entitled "Naval Forces in Local Wars."
132
Stalbo extols the local war capabilities of aircraft carriers,
asserting "the combat attributes of aircraft carriers fully
satisfied the plans of the American command in local wars....
[Ref. 49: p. 29] Stalbo continues his obvious pro-carrier
advocacy but emphasizing that, during local wars, aircraft
carriers "reaffirmed" their high combat capabilities. Hence,
it appears that Stalbo was informing his readers that though
the aircraft carrier had limited use in a major nuclear war
between opposing social systems, they can play an extremely
important part in local or small wars. In a 1977 Morskoi
Sbornik article entitled "Winning Sea Supremacy," the author
articulated the requirement of naval forces engaged in combat
to gain "sea supremacy." This concept of military science
long neglected during the 1960s was resurrected in the early
1970s. [Ref. 50: p. 6] The author vehemently states that
the achievement of "sea supremacy" in designated areas of
operations is essential to the successful execution of
subsequent operations in the theater. He also states that
war experience showed that "winning supremacy is impossible
without a preponderance of forces in the air as well."
[Ref. 51: p. 24] Thus, it appears that the author was
obliquely referring to the efficacy of aircraft carriers as
the sole providers of this "preponderance of forces in the
air" during naval operations in remote oceans of the world.
Another extremely favorable account of carrier operations
in local wars was contained in the June 1978 issue of
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Morskoi Sbornik. The author, Admiral Stalbo, was extremly
vociferous in his praise of carriers in local wars. Stalbo
asserts that the utility of aircraft carriers in local wars
has had a definite impact on the development of naval theory.*
Hence, it seems that naval operations in local wars,
especially those of aircraft carriers, help determine the
development of the navy. Furthermore, he states that it was
the Korean War (local war) which enhanced the aircraft
carrier's importance in American military doctrine. He
stresses that aircraft carriers are the most important
element of the American navy. Moreover, Stalbo asserts that
aircraft carriers are a very "important means of sea control
and are the most versatile of all weapons systems." [Ref.
52: p. 67] According to Stalbo, aircraft carriers are a
"most important weapon capable of accomplishing all major
missions in local wars." [Ref. 52: p. 68] He asserts that
aircraft carriers can be used in lieu of ground forces in
local conflicts. This advantage is very important to a
government averse to employing its own forces in combat.
Moreover, Stalbo emphasizes that in all local wars, aircraft
carriers have performed the "functions of the chief strike
force of the aggressor" and at times were the "only platforms
for concentrated striking power...." [Ref. 52: p. 68]
*The theory of the navy is a system of scientific knowledge
revealing the laws and regularities of naval warefare and the
principles of the Navy's organizational development and of its
preparation and employment in the Armed Forces system during a
war and in peacetime. It defines the prospects and direction
of the Navy's development on a scientific basis. [Ref 53: p. 27
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Stalbo' s preference for nuclear-powered aircraft carriers
appears clear. He devotes several long passages praising
the advantages of nuclear-powered carriers stressing nuclear
carriers have the capability to conduct "protracted operations"
and "long passages" without replenishment. [Ref. 52: p. 76]
In addition to their wartime missions, the aircraft carrier
also fulfills "gendarme" functions as well. [Ref. 52: p. 69]
Stalbo concludes his favorable appraisal of aircraft
carriers stating that there is "no basis to speak of a future
reduction in the importance of carriers in armed warfare at
sea." On the contrary, according to Stalbo, "we must speak
of an increase in their role in military operations." [Ref.
52: p. 78]
The second edition of Gorshkov's Sea Power of the State,
appearing in 1979 reiterated the favorable treatment of
attack aircraft carriers apparent in his earlier edition.
The fact that the 1979 rendition was for all practical
purposes identical to the 1976 edition implies that the
policy line pertaining to attack aircraft carriers remained
intact. Gorshkov still referred to attack carriers as the
basic means of power projection in local wars and emphasized
that aircraft carriers provide a base of operations where
no base had existed. [Ref. 11: p. 165] He again stressed
the importance of aircraft carriers in providing aircraft in
the "fleet against the shore" role which remained of primary
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importance in Naval Art. Americans apply this "fleet against
shore" role of navies in local wars with aircraft carriers.
He states that the increased range of their aircraft make
them the most important forces in local wars. At times they
were the only means "for bringing the bases of strike
aviation closer to the areas of combat operations." [Ref.
11: p. 236]
The efficacy of aircraft carriers in local wars continues
to receive favorable press in the 1980s. They are still
referred to as the primary weapon system in the conduct of
local wars and are still viewed as the only viable means of
providing air defense to naval forces operating far from
friendly bases. [Ref. 54: p. 19]
The Anglo-Argentine Falklands campaign seemed to reaffirm
to Soviet authors the requirement for air support of naval
forces during naval combat operations. According to Rear
Admiral I.F. Uskov, the war for the Malvinas "showed with
full clarity ...that under modern conditions no ship formation
(including an amphibious assault formation) is capable of
effectively carrying out assigned missions without reliable
air cover." [Ref. 55: p. 110] Captain 1st Rank B. Rodionov,
in an article appearing in the January 1983 issue of
Morskoi Sbornik, emphasizes the "necessity of winning supremacy
in the air and maintaining it for a prolonged time both on
an operational as well as a tactical scale." [Ref. 56: p. 75]
Admiral I.M. Kapitanets, describing the Falklands war,
echoed similar thoughts one month later:
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....there is a continuing increase in the role of aircraft
in combat actions at sea. Without winning and holding
air supremacy on an operational and tactical scale, it is
impossible to count on success of an action or an operation
as a whole. [Ref. 57: p. 17]
The British Sea Harrier and Harrier USTOL aircraft received
mixed reviews by Soviet naval analysts. One analyst emphasized
that although "vertical take-off aircraft showed relatively
high tactical qualities," there remains "no basis for
overestimating their combat capabilities." [Ref. 56: p. 75]
Offering further criticism of the Harrier, the author asserts
that the British never did achieve air supremacy. [Ref.
56: p. 75]
Most commentary on the Falklands War seemed to vindicate
the advocates of modern CTOL aircraft. Though Soviet writers
pointed out that the USTOL Harrier was more maneuverable than
its Argentine counterparts in close-in combat, [Ref. 58: p. 64]
the overall appraisal seemed to denigrate the capabilities
of the Harrier.
D. CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that the leaders of the Soviet Union now
view the attack aircraft carrier more favorably, especially
when one compares contemporary Soviet writings with those
prior to the 1970s. Noticeably absent from present carrier
rhetoric are the flagrantly anti-carrier statements heralding
the inevitable demise of this type of ship. Furthermore,
the Soviets perceive a definite link between carriers and
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their efficacy in conventional warfare even though they are
still viewed as extremely vulnerable to nuclear weaponry.
Regardless of this disadvantage, the Soviets, upon observing
U.S. experiences in Third World conflicts, perceive the
definite utility of aircraft carriers in local wars.
The Politburo has come to accept the role of attack
aircraft carriers in the pursuit of their foreign policy
objectives in the developing world. The aircraft carrier
complements well their apparent acceptance of a greater
military role in Third World crises. The Soviets realize
that the attack aircraft carrier provides certain military
advantages not apparent in other forms of weaponry. They
perceive in aircraft carriers a means of projecting Soviet
airpower to distant areas of the world where access to
land-based airfields is not guaranteed. It is also a means
of protecting naval assets at sea and of competing for "air
supremacy," a critical prerequisite for gaining sea control
in theaters of operations areas far removed from friendly
fighter bases.
The local war mission will not be the aircraft carrier's
only role in the overall Soviet military doctrine. The
Soviets appreciate the mission flexibility of this type of
ship and it will surely be tasked to perform many missions of
which defense of the homeland is primary. However, the local
war mission appears to be extremely important and probably
provided one of the major rationales for the decision to
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build it. The Soviet Union has learned that it is not enough
to establish a "socialist oriented" regime in some remote
Third World outpost. It is also necessary to maintain them
and this may require a more direct Soviet military role.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Although economic constraints and technological deficiencies
played an inhibiting role, at times, in Soviet plans to con-
struct true aircraft carriers, the primary reason for their
failure to construct such ships until now has been doctrinal.
During the early years of Soviet development and the immediate
post World War II period, Soviet industry could not support
the construction of such large and sophisticated naval com-
batants. But during times of relative high Soviet industrial
growth occurring in the late 1930s and again in the 1950s,
the Politburo, probably heeding the advice of its ground
oriented Defense Committee, refused to build true attack
aircraft carriers. It is difficult to believe, as some in
the West have contended, that the Soviet Union was incapable
of building such large ships. Soviet military equipment is
in many areas qualitatively similar or in some cases superior
to its Western counterparts. The Soviets commit large amounts
of resources to military research and development and failings
in the consumer sector do not appear so frequently in the
military hardware sector.
It appears that the decision not to construct carriers
was based on military doctrine. Stalin and his military
advisors failed to foresee the efficacy of sea-based aviation
in the Second World War. Naval aviation was relegated to
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missions of reconnaisance with a distant secondary role of
fleet air protection. The battleship and heavy cruiser were
the dominant naval weapons during the interwar period and
Stalin seemed infatuated with them; not so much with what
they could do during wartime as what they could accomplish
in peacetime. The Soviet Union was a continental power,
openly disinterested in areas of the world not immediately
adjacent to the USSR or which did not impact directly on its
security.
With Stalin still at the helm, the postwar Soviet defense
planners did not alter their ideas of naval forces. The
USSR remained a continental power. Although the tremendous
utility of aircraft carriers was demonstrated during the
Second World War, Moscow did not perceive a requirement for
them in its overall defensive doctrine.
Khrushchev, upon consolidating his power in the mid 1950s,
redesigned the Soviet Navy, but its missions remained the
same: defense of the homeland. He criticized Stalin's large
construction program and rejuventated the small army psychology
of the late 1920s and 1930s. In the era of nuclear weapons,
large naval forces, including aircraft carriers, were viewed
as extremely vulnerable and hence their construction in-
expedient during the time when relatively small and inexpensive
naval forces armed with nuclear- tipped missiles and submarines
could accomplish the defensive mission quite well. Khrushchev
advocated a modern air force and rocket forces. Again naval
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forces, especially large surface forces, had limited utility
in modern war and, as in continental wars in the past, they
would not be decisive.
Western advances in carrier aviation and sub-launched
ballistic missiles raised Moscow's interest in oceanic defense
and fomented interest in deploying large and more capable
naval forces to combat this threat. The Soviets constructed
their first air-capable ship during the mid 1960s in an
apparent attempt to counter Western SSBNs . Soviet strategic
naval advances ( Delta/SSN-8) caused a shift in their naval
doctrine inspiring the construction of the Kiev to defend
their bastions. However, both of these platforms were
defensive naval weapons. Although both are imbued with the
capabilities to accomplish a range of tasks, their primary
role is ASW. The construction of a true Soviet attack air-
craft carrier with modern CTOL capabilities would signal
another shift in naval doctrine; from one primarily of
defense to one of offense.
The premise of this paper contends that the Soviet
decision to construct their first true attack aircraft
carrier utilizing CTOL technology and the Politburo's ac-
ceptance of a greater role for their military forces in Third
World crises including local wars was probably more than a
mere coincidence. This writer argues that the efficacy of
aircraft carriers in distant areas, tried and proven in the




The apparent shift in Soviet local war doctrine seemed to
coincide with the construction of the CTOL aircraft carrier.
Before the late 1960s, Soviet policy towards Third World
crises was cautious and circumspect. The thought of local
wars escalating into nuclear major war remained a powerful
determinant of Moscow's foreign policy vis-a-vis the developing
world. However, growing Soviet military strength, especially
in the strategic area, convinced the USSR of a favorable shift
in the correlation of forces. Furthermore, the evolution of
a world power in the early 1970s demanded a greater Soviet
role in the Third World. With the favorable shift in cor-
relation of forces, no longer would local wars automatically
or necessarily escalate to major wars. Having achieved rough
strategic nuclear parity with the U.S., the USSR would not
have to cow to American movements in the developing world.
Parity provided Moscow with the perception that local wars
could be managed and escalation contained. Moscow would still
remain cautious, but a greater interventionist role in
remote crises was discerned.
Furthermore, events in the Third World during the 1970s
and early 1980s (Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia) demanded greater
participation by the Soviet military. These revealed a
definite requirement to develop capabilities to maintain and
defend "a nation on the path of socialist development in the
defense of socialism."
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Moscow had long appreciated the utility of naval forces
in the support of "state interests;" however, it wasn't until
the early 1970s that this naval mission received widespread
dissemination. Admiral Gorshkov's series entitled "Navies
in War and in Peace" articulated the special advantages for
projecting power and influence into distant regions of the
world that are not readily apparent in the other branches of
the armed forces but which the navy has. The Soviets under-
stand that navies in peacetime represent a clear potential
force, able in many cases to effect a solution to a crisis
favorable to the aggressor without resorting to hostilities.
This is very important to a conservative-minded Politburo,
cautious in their policy applications. However, if war occurs,
the Soviet navy would be, in many situations, the only viable
means of projecting power to areas distant to Soviet borders.
Moscow appreciates the mission flexibility and mobility of
naval forces, and recognizes that navies do not require
foreign bases whose access may not be forthcoming in time of
crisis
.
Moscow began to put historical platitudes into practice
in the mid 1960s and in the process realized that its navy
could play a critical part in molding Third World crisis
situations. Beginning in earnest with its substantial dis-
patch of naval combatants to the Mediterranean during and
after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli six-day war, the Politburo
has employed its navy in many incidents in the Third World.
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The 1973 Arab- Israeli War (Yom Kippur) represented a watershed
in Soviet practice in local wars involving the U.S. Though
the Soviet Union possessed the capabilities before to inflict
damage to American naval units, this marked the first occasion
when the display of Soviet potential force was underlined by
roughly symmetrical Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities
vis-a-vis the U.S. This fact could not be overlooked by U.S.
policymakers and probably served to enhance the credibility
of that potential naval force. Although the large Soviet
naval presence may not have restricted the movement of U.S.
Navy ships during the crisis, seemingly cautious movements
may have been perceived by regional players as a diminution
of U.S. influence in the area. In today's international
environment, perceptions are at times just as, if not more,
important as reality. In any event, Washington can no longer
arbitrarily conduct its policy in a crisis environment where
Soviet interests are concerned without taking into account
Soviet power.
Not lost on Soviet military strategists is the role of
the attack aircraft carrier in Third World crises. Although
Soviet military writers had reflected earlier on the utility
of such ships in local wars, this concept became a primary
issue in Soviet military writings (especially navy) beginning
in the late 1960s and has continued to be an important topic
in military contemporary scholarship. Through most of this
period Soviet authors wrote favorably about aircraft carriers
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in general and their role in local wars in particular. Absent
in the wide preponderance of these writings were the flagrantly
disparaging remarks about aircraft carriers so prevalent in
the 1950s and 1960s. Though Soviet writers still voiced their
concern for the vulnerability of aircraft carriers to nuclear
weapons, they asserted that these ships are surprisingly
survivable in conventional wars. Furthermore, aircraft
carriers provided a ready base from which to conduct air
operations in remote areas of operations. In light of the
Soviet forced withdrawal from both Egypt and Somalia, this
advantage became extremely important. Moreover, as has long
been emphasized by naval writers, carriers provide the best
means of defense for ships operating at sea and are the only
realistic means of competing for air superiority. The latter
was recognized by the Soviets as a prerequisite for winning
control of the sea. Since land-based aviation may not be
available in certain Third World crises, air capable ships,
especially CTOL aircraft carriers, would be required to
project Soviet air power to distant theaters of operations.
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